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Greed is good. Greed is right. Greed works. 
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price of a paper clip. We pick that rabbit out of a hat while everybody sits 
around wondering how the hell we did it. Now you're not naïve enough to 
think that we're living in a democracy, are you, Buddy? It's the free market, 
and you're part of it. 
 
-- Gordon Gecko, Wall Street 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
At the top of the corporate pyramid sits the chief executive officer 
(“CEO”).  Along with the board of directors, the CEO is primarily 
responsible for the success of the company.  When companies fail due to a 
breakdown in governance or financial misconduct, shareholders lose.  
Other stakeholders lose as well, including competitors, employees, and 
ultimately the public at large. 
It turns out that naked greed is not so good or right.  The economic 
and social costs of unmitigated greed include the failure of some of the 
largest financial and insurance institutions in the world, government 
bailouts on a scale previously unimaginable, crisis in the credit markets, 
numerous corporate bankruptcies, and a badly demoralized stock market.1  
Over-leveraged and unregulated risk taking, fueled by greed, has become 
business as usual for some of the most revered companies in the United 
States.2  The fall of these publicly traded companies has crippled the U.S. 
economy and spawned a worldwide recession.3
The “culture of corporate greed” decried almost a decade ago by then 
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan following the collapse of 
Enron has continued unchecked.
 
4
 
 1. For a detailed discussion and description of events precipitating the present 
financial crisis, see Inside the Meltdown (PBS television broadcast Feb. 17, 2009), available 
at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/meltdown/view/ (last visited July 7, 2010). 
  Then, as now, management 
 2. See RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE 
FUNDS, AND THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 156 (2007) (observing that it is more 
likely that an unanticipated crisis will arise when market participants have a self-interest in 
gaming the system); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 206 (2008) 
(explaining that market participants have insufficient incentive to internalize their 
externalities because the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources accrue to individual 
market participants whereas the costs of exploitation, which affect the real economy, are 
distributed among an even wider class of persons); see also Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta 
Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long Term, 
26 YALE J. ON REG. 359 (2009) (linking pay packages to excessive risk-taking in the 
financial system).  Coverage of the financial disaster was spread across the front pages of 
every major U.S. newspaper as well as documented in live broadcasts.  The media described 
the disaster that not only included the failure of companies like Merrill Lynch, Lehman 
Brothers, and Bear Stearns, but also of Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac, arguably the two 
largest companies on earth, which collectively held $5 trillion in mortgages.  Inside the 
Meltdown, supra note 1. 
 3. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime 
Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373 (2008) (examining the causes of the subprime 
crisis and its devolution into a larger global financial crisis); Fabrizio Ferri & James Weber, 
AFSCME vs. Mozilo...and "Say on Pay" for All! (B), Harvard Business School Case No. 9-
109-157, at 1 (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, Mar. 18, 2009) (summarizing 
the sequence of events). 
 4. Richard S. Stevens, Culture of Corporate Greed, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2002, at C8; 
see also Louis Lavelle, The Best & Worst Boards: How the Corporate Scandals are 
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irresponsibility produced a ripple effect on multiple stakeholders.5  At that 
time, innumerable news headlines revealed corporate fraud, accounting 
scandals, restatements of corporate earnings, and a shaken market.6  Yet the 
greed precipitating the demise of Arthur Andersen, Tyco, Merrill Lynch, 
Adelphia, and other failures in governance and ethics were but a shadow of 
things to come.7
History repeated itself despite corporate corrections and claims of 
moral and social obligations.  Promises of ethical administration, however,  
 
were often honored in their breach.8
 
Sparking a Revolution in Governance, BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 7, 2002 (describing Enron as 
the “biggest governance failure in modern corporate history”).  More recently, Harvard 
professors Rakesh Khurana and Andy Zelleke advised that “contemporary business culture 
has distorted the spirit of traditional American capitalism—ill at ease with unearned 
wealth—by rewarding mediocrity and even failure.”  You Can Cap The Pay, But The Greed 
Will Go On, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2009, at B4. 
  Management deviance was likewise 
 5. See Patty M. DeGaetano, The Shareholder Direct Access Teeter-Totter: Will 
Increased Shareholder Voice in the Director Nomination Process Protect Investors?, 41 
CAL. W. L. REV. 361, 361 (2005) (“Enron and its progeny . . . cause[d] an unimaginable 
ripple effect on the market, as tens of billions of dollars of market capital was destroyed, 
workers’ retirement plans were devastated, shareholders’ dreams were ruined, and 
individual investors’ trust in the stock market was shattered.”); Faith Stevelman Kahn, 
Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron, Financial Fraud, and September 11, 
2001, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1579, 1585 (2002) (discussing the impact of the Enron collapse in the 
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and noting “[l]ike that of the Twin 
Towers, Enron’s collapse was sudden, devastating, and horribly unjust in its effect”). 
 6. Enron’s fraud cost shareholders around $70 billion when the company’s stock price 
collapsed.  Bruce S. Schaeffer, Shelter from the Storm, THE DAILY DEAL (Aug. 11, 2003).  
When WorldCom collapsed, it took the entire sector with it.  Worldcom’s investors lost 
$180 billion, competitors’ investors lost $7.8 billion, and overall social welfare costs were 
estimated to be $49 billion.  Gil Sadka, The Economic Consequences of Accounting Fraud 
in Product Markets: Theory and a Case from the U.S. Telecommunications Industry 
(WorldCom), 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 439, 463 (2006). 
 7. See, e.g., Year of Scandal, Year of Shame, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 23, 2002, at 6 (citing the 
senior executives of companies involved in Enron and other financial debacles that were 
charged with fraud and other crimes); Citizen Works, The Corporate Scandal Sheet, 
http://www.citizenworks.org/corp/corp-scandal.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (listing 
companies investigated for dishonesty and fraud from 2001-2005).  See generally Lawrence 
A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and It Might 
Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003) (reviewing big four frauds and reading Sarbanes-
Oxley reforms as modest at best); Cary Coglianese et al., The Role of Government in 
Corporate Government, Regulatory Policy Program Report RPP-08 (Cambridge, MA: 
Center for Business and Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
University, 2004) (summarizing conference dialogue concerning potential reforms to restore 
corporate integrity and market confidence). 
 8. See WILLIAM S. LAUFER, CORPORATE BODIES AND GUILTY MINDS: THE FAILURE OF 
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 158-59 (2006) (listing an array of corporate ethical 
representations from companies (or their senior executives) that were under criminal 
investigation).  Many corporations engage in “blue-washing” and “green-washing.”  “Blue-
washing” corporations claim the mantle of ethical leadership by affiliating with the United 
Nations while doing little to actualize the ideals of the Global Compact; “green-washing” is 
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not deterred by the plethora of reforms and high-profile investigations and 
prosecutions.9  Neither the changes in the law nor the emphasis on its 
enforcement were enough to stem the ubiquity of greed.10
Amidst daily revelations of corporate misdeeds, the ideas of business 
ethics, good corporate citizenship, and organizational accountability are  
 
being addressed with new resolve.11
 
done by making dubious public relations claims about sustainability and eco-friendly 
actions.  See, e.g., William S. Laufer, Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing, 
12 J. BUS. ETHICS 253 (2003) (discussing companies’ social reporting and corporate 
compliance responsibilities).  Reputation washing extends far beyond genuine public 
relations practice to include insidious deception.  LAUFER, supra, at 163 (“It is trickery that 
not only uses publicity to explain the problem away but also portrays the ethical laggard—
the [. . .]washer—as an ethical leader.”); see also Donald O. Mayer, Kasky v. Nike and the 
Quarrelsome Question of Corporate Free Speech, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 65-96 (2007) 
(analyzing the first legal challenge of reputation washing as consumer fraud and its ethical 
implications).  Washing as it relates to social accounting is also common practice.  See 
David Owen & Tracey Swift, Introduction: Social Accounting: Reporting and Auditing: 
Beyond the Rhetoric?, 10 BUS. ETHICS: EUROPEAN REV. 4 (2001) (noting the “specious 
gloss” on social reporting initiatives in the United States and Europe).  For a history of 
corporate reputation management and the quest for social and moral legitimacy, see 
ROLAND MARCHLAND, CREATING THE CORPORATE SOUL: THE RISE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS 
AND CORPORATE IMAGERY IN AMERICAN BIG BUSINESS (1998). 
  The “greed is good” mantra once 
 9. See, e.g., LAUFER, supra note 8, at 40-41 (listing hundreds of lawsuits against 
numerous multi-national companies instituted by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
the Corporate Fraud Task Force, and Department of Justice in the aftermath of Sarbanes-
Oxley).  Then President Bush established the Corporate Fraud Task Force with the goal of 
“cleaning up corruption in the board room and restoring investor confidence.”  CORPORATE 
FRAUD TASK FORCE, SECOND YEAR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (2004).  He declared that:  
“Corporate responsibility is essential to America.  It is essential to shareholders.  It is 
essential to investors.”  Id.  These efforts were undertaken to calm investor fears, revive 
perceptions of legitimacy in markets, and demonstrate the resolve of state and federal 
regulators.  See Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from 
the Recent Financial Scandals about Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of 
Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285 (2004) (providing an overview of reforms aimed at 
enabling better oversight of various corporate stakeholders); see also Henry T.C. Hu, 
Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of 
Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1502 (1993) (observing that government 
and not the private sector has the incentive to become informed about systemic risks). 
 10. LAUFER, supra note 8; see also Khurana & Zelleke, supra note 4, at B4 (“[P]ublic 
companies have become largely personal ATMs, machines from which to extract as much 
personal wealth as quickly as possible, within the boundaries of the law (usually).”); cf. 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the ‘Subprime’ Mortgage Crisis, 60 S. C. L. REV. 549 
(2009) (noting the need for regulation to address the collective-action problem of systemic 
risk even in the absence of greed). 
 11. The basic concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is that business has 
responsibilities beyond shareholders or investors in the firm.  One of the early classics on 
corporate social responsibility is HOWARD R. BOWEN, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE 
BUSINESSMAN (1953).  Bowen believed that the several hundred largest businesses in the 
United States were vital centers of power and decision making; thus, the decisions of these 
businesses affected the lives of citizens in many ways.  He believed that businesses had the 
responsibility to conform to the values and aims of the society in which they were 
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heard on Wall Street has been replaced with an urgent cry for conscience 
and a restoration of confidence in corporate behavior.12  In fact, the gravity 
of the current crisis has pushed reform proposals to the front of the public 
policy agenda in our nation’s capital.  As Wall Street moves to K Street, 
the effectiveness of existing laws, regulations, and regulatory bodies are 
being re-examined in a search for long-term reform.13
One target of the reform measures is excessive executive 
 
 
embedded.  At the time, 93% of businessmen surveyed agreed with him.  CSR became a 
frequent topic of conversation among businesspeople in the 1970s, which was one reason 
that economist Milton Friedman came out with his often-quoted article for the New York 
Times magazine, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits.” (Sept. 13, 
1970).  The essence of Friedman’s critique, still debated to this day, is that managers have 
no special expertise in philanthropy or social good, and that managers who spend corporate 
equity to be “socially responsible” are wrongfully using shareholder money without clear 
benefit to the company.  Despite this critique, the notion that corporations have 
responsibilities beyond those to its investors continues to have many adherents.  See, e.g., 
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (C.K. Prahalad & Michael E. 
Porter eds., 2003); Archie Carroll, Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a 
Definitional Construct, 38 BUS. & SOC’Y 268 (1999); see also ED FREEMAN, STRATEGIC 
MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984) (promoting “stakeholder theory” in 
contrast to seeing the corporation as solely responsible to its shareholders). 
More recently, management and business ethics scholars have advanced a related 
notion of corporate citizenship.  Simply put, corporate citizenship is “CSR plus.”  The 
“plus” speaks to a corporation’s public advocacy, including its lobbying efforts.  To some 
observers, this goes beyond giving moral consideration to stakeholders beyond investors, 
and speaks to the power of corporations to influence public policy that sets the rules of the 
game for business activities.  For the growing discussion of corporate citizenship, see DAVID 
VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY (2005); Dirk Matten et al., Behind the Mask: Revealing the True Face of 
Corporate Citizenship, J. BUS. ETHICS 109 (2003); Andreas Georg Scherer & Guido 
Palazzo, Toward a Political Conception of Corporate Responsibility: Business and Society 
Seen from a Habermasian Perspective, 32 ACAD. MGT. REV. 1096 (2007).  For an earlier 
debate over the objective of business, compare A.A. Berle Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers 
in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931) with E. Merrick Dodd Jr., For Whom Are Corporate 
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). 
 12. See Remarks on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1319 (July 
30, 2002), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2002-book2/pdf/PPP-2002-
book2-doc-pg1319.pdf (last visited July 7, 2010) (“[C]orporate corruption has struck at 
investor confidence, offending the conscience of our Nation.”).  See also Sarah H. Duggin & 
Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate Directors: The Disney Standard and the 
“New” Good Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 211, 261 (2006) (“Corporate governance reform 
became a national priority following the financial disasters that ravaged Enron, WorldCom 
and other corporate giants beginning in the fall of 2001.”). 
 13. See Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, Op-Ed, The End of the Financial World as 
We Know It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at WK9 (criticizing the governmental focus on short-
term improvements in investor confidence); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating 
Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 266-67 (2010) (proposing a 
market-liquidity-provider concept as an improvement over the current ad hoc approaches 
taken by the Bush and Obama administrations); infra notes 14, 37-38 (discussing 
government reforms). 
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compensation.14  Indeed, with skyrocketing CEO paychecks15 linked to 
layoffs, plant closings, and corporate downsizing,16
 
 14. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, FDIC Pushes to Rein in Executive Pay at Banks, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/01/12/AR2010011201492.html? (last visited July 7, 2010)  
(discussing proposal advanced by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to penalize 
banks for risky compensation practices);  Andrea Fuller, House Backs Limits on Pay To 
Executives, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2009, at B1 (reviewing passage of the bill introduced by 
Barney Frank, Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, to limit executive pay 
by eliminating conflict of interests on compensation committees, requiring nonbinding 
shareholder vote on pay, and authorizing rulemaking to regulate pay packages at companies 
whose assets total more than $1 billion).  The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008 (EESA), for instance, has a number of restrictions on executive pay for the 
participating firms.  See Ferri & Weber, supra note 3, at Exhibit 2 (summarizing the 
executive compensation provisions in the EESA); see also V.G. Narayanan et al., Executive 
Pay and the Credit Crisis of 2008, Harvard Business School Case No. 109-036 (Boston: 
Harvard Business School Publishing, 2008) (discussing the credit crisis, executive 
compensation, and their interaction).  The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 
subsequently passed in February 2009 after the transition to the Obama administration, 
added new restrictions for highly-paid executives of financial institutions that receive TARP 
assistance, including prohibitions against paying bonuses, retention awards, or incentive 
compensation (other than payments of long-term restricted stock).  H.R. REP. NO. 111-64, at 
2-3 (2009).  Notably, the statutory limitations on pay do not affect the past compensation of 
executives at those failing financial institutions whose CEOs received billions for their 
actions that helped bring down the investment-banking system and cause the credit crisis.  
Id.; see also Tom Randall & Jamie McGee, Wall Street Executives Made $3 Billion Before 
Crisis, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 26, 2008, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aGL5l6xOPEHc (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2010) (“Wall Street's five biggest firms paid more than $3 billion in the last five 
years to their top executives, while they presided over the packaging and sale of loans that 
helped bring down the investment-banking system.”). 
 few issues in the 
 15. Between 1970 and 1996, median cash compensation paid to S&P 500 CEOs 
(including salaries, bonuses, and small amounts of other cash pay) more than doubled.  
Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation 1 (April 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with authors) [hereinafter Executive Compensation].  During the same timeframe, median 
total realized compensation (including cash pay, restricted stock, payouts from long-term 
pay programs, and the amounts realized from exercising stock options) nearly quadrupled.  
Id. at 76.  From 1992 through 2000, “median total compensation nearly tripled from $2.3 
million in 1992 to over $6.5 million in 2000.”  Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive 
Compensation: Managerial Power Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 847, 847 (2002) (referring specifically to chief executive officers in S&P 500 
Industrials (companies excluding utilities and finance firms)).  In 2006, the median total 
compensation of the top 150 U.S. CEOs was $10.1 million.  Edward Dash, More pieces. 
Still a puzzle., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at sec.3; see also Jeffrey Moriarty, How Much 
Compensation Can CEOs Permissibly Accept?, 19 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235, 235 (2009) (noting 
CEO pay is 314 times the $32,142 earned by the median full-time private industry worker in 
the U.S. in 2006). 
 16. See Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation and the Modern Industrial 
Revolution, 15 INT’L J. INDUST. ORG. 417 (1997) (noting perception of high CEO salaries as 
producing harmful consequences); Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive 
Compensation, 63 U. CINN. L. REV. 713 (1995) (same); accord Michael C. Jensen, The 
Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 
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history of the modern corporation have attracted as much attention.17  
Commentators have noted that it “has taken center stage in the governance 
reform debate in the United States.”18
The suggested legislative correctives are reinforced by the ethics 
literature where much critical ink has been spilt regarding ethical duties in 
corporate governance.
 
19  There is a developing consensus that directors 
have a moral obligation not to pay excessive executive compensation 
relative to performance, the market, or other indicators.20
 
831 (1993) (showing that downsizing increases stock prices in industries with excess 
capacity which would tie layoffs to an increase in value of executive stock options); see also 
James B. Wade et al., Overpaid CEOs and Underpaid Managers: Equity and Executive 
Compensation, 17 ORGAN. SCIENCE 527 (2006) (surveying literature showing that perceived 
pay inequities lead to lower productivity and product quality, decreased employee morale, 
and increased turnover); cf. David Hirshleifer, Managerial Reputation and Corporate 
Investment Decisions, 22 FIN. MGMT. 145, 146 (1993) (explaining that investor beliefs about 
manager and firm reputation influence the cost of raising capital, recruiting employees, and 
marketing products). 
  Some 
 17. Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note 15, at 1 (“Once relegated to the 
relative obscurity of business periodicals, executive pay has become an international issue 
debated in Congress and routinely featured in front-page headlines, cover stories, and 
television news shows.”). 
 18. Fabrizio Ferri & David Maber, Say on Pay Vote and CEO Compensation: Evidence 
from the UK 2 (Mar. 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).  William H. 
Donaldson, former Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman, explained: “One of the 
great, as-yet-unsolved problems in the country today is executive compensation and how it 
is determined.”  Lori Calabro, Regulators and Shareholders Want Compensation 
Committees to Explain Why CEOs Make So Much, CFO MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 2003, available 
at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3010475?f=related (last visited July 7, 2010).  The new 
constraints on executive pay proposed in the bill passed by the House on July 31, 2009 are 
also evidence that Congress was serious about regulating compensation packages with large 
bonuses that are often cited as a cause of the financial crisis.  See Fuller, supra note 14 
(discussing the proposed bill).  The Senate was set to consider executive compensation as 
part of a regulatory overhaul package after its August recess.  Id. 
 19. See STEPHEN M. GOLDMAN, TEMPTATIONS IN THE OFFICE: ETHICAL CHOICES AND 
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS (2008) (asserting that business men and women have moral duties not 
encompassed by legal requirements); see also Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, 
Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235 (2002) 
(arguing that clarification of the criteria on which executives are evaluated will maximize 
value); John J. McCall, Assessing American Executive Compensation: A Cautionary Tale 
for Europeans, 13 BUS. ETHICS: A EUROPEAN REV. 243 (2004) (assessing executive pay 
from a moral perspective); Bruce Walters et al., Top Executive Compensation: Equity or 
Excess? Implications for Regaining American Competitiveness, 14 J. BUS. ETHICS 227 
(1995) (calling for reforms to ensure compensation is not controlled solely by management); 
cf. Alexei M. Marcoux, A Fiduciary Argument Against Stakeholder Theory, 13 BUS. ETHICS 
Q. 1 (2003) (demonstrating the moral inadequacy of stakeholder theory).  See generally 
John Hasnas, The Normative Theories of Business Ethics: A Guide for the Perplexed, 8 BUS. 
ETHICS Q. 19 (1998) (examining three normative theories of business ethics). 
 20. See Mel Perel, An Ethical Perspective on CEO Compensation, 48 J. BUS. ETHICS 
381, 385-86 (2003) (examining the ethical considerations in CEO compensation); see also 
Jeffrey Moriarty, Do CEOs Get Paid Too Much?, 15 BUS. ETHICS Q. 257 (2005) (arguing 
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scholarship even suggests that the CEO has an ethical obligation not to 
accept such excessive compensation.21
The absence of ethical awareness among elite boards is amply 
illustrated in the actions of American International Group (AIG).  The 
insurance giant engendered public disapproval when it paid millions of 
dollars in bonuses to its top employees in the wake of a 180 billion dollar 
government bail-out.
 
22  As for the credit default swap business gone awry 
that caused the company’s downfall, former CEO Greenberg explained:  
“They got greedy.”23  Given the Obama administration’s acquiescence in 
the face of AIG’s insistence that contract considerations have tied its hands 
in attempting a return of taxpayer money, AIG also apparently got away 
with it.24
 
that CEOs get paid too much under any theory); discussion infra Part V.B. 
 
 21. Moriarty, supra note 20; discussion infra Part V.B. 
 22. In September 2008, the Federal Reserve authorized the first infusion of cash to 
AIG.  Congress later supplemented these funds with the $700 billion bailout bill (EESA), 
which established the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP).  See Edmund L. Andrews et 
al., Fed in an $85 Billion Rescue of an Insurer Near Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at 
A1 (calling the Federal Reserve’s loan the “most radical intervention in private business in 
the central bank’s history”); Stephen Bernard, Bailed-Out AIG Seeks Gov’t Approval to 
Give Million-dollar Bonuses to Executives, ASSOC. PRESS, July 10, 2009, 
http://www.cnsnews.com/public/content/article.aspx?RsrcID=50854 (noting AIG’s total 
loan package is $182.5 billion); see also After Rescue, Bonuses Still Flow At AIG, CBS 
NEWS ONLINE, Dec. 11, 2008, http://cbs2.com/business/aig.federal.bailout.2.884982 
[hereinafter After Rescue] (quoting the Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury calling the 
retention payments “excessive” for a failing institution).  Prior to the bonus payments, the 
company executives enjoyed a desert spa retreat within days of receiving the government’s 
infusion of cash.  Peter Whoriskey, AIG Spa Trip Fuels Fury on Hill, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 
2008, at D1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/10/07/AR2008100702604.html?sid=ST2008100702063. 
 23. Ex-CEO Greenberg Calls for Revamped AIG Bailout, WORKFORCE MGMT., Apr. 7, 
2009, available at http://www.workforce.com/section/00/article/26/29/87.php.  AIG sued 
Greenberg for illegally taking $4.3 billion in stock the year of his departure.  Mary Williams 
Walsh, Ex-chief and AIG Set for Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2009, at B1. 
 24. See Obama Tries to Stop AIG Bonuses: “How Do They Justify This Outrage?”, 
CNN NEWS, Mar. 16, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/03/16/AIG.bonuses/index.html; Edmund L. Andrews 
& Peter Baker, A.I.G. Planning Huge Bonuses After $170 Billion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
14, 2009, at A1, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/business/15AIG.html?emc=eta1 (reporting that when 
word of bonuses reached the Obama administration, U.S. “Treasury Secretary Timothy F. 
Geithner told the firm they were unacceptable and demanded they be renegotiated . . . . but 
that the bonuses w[ould] go forward because lawyers said the firm was contractually 
obligated to pay them.”).  Congress did attempt to reclaim the funds via an excise tax.  See 
Greg Hitt, Drive to Tax AIG Bonus Slows, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2009, at A1, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123794222776332903.html (reporting that a bill imposing a 
90% excise tax on AIG bonuses paid to individual employees passed the House); see also 
The AIG Key Executives Bonus Accountability and Capture Act, H.R. 1598, 111th Cong. 
(1st Sess. 2009).  The House Judiciary Committee also attempted to remedy the audacity of 
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The AIG situation is neither new nor unique.25  In this country and 
abroad, “fat cats” and “rewards for failure,” such as handsome retirement 
packages and option repricings, have incited shareholder and community 
outrage.26  Outside the United States, calls for increased accountability to 
shareholders have been heard and legislation adopted.27  Within the 
country, the debate continues as federal and state policymakers jockey for 
position along with the corporate clientele they serve.28
 
AIG in the “End Greed” Bill (End Government Reimbursement of Excessive Executive 
Disbursements).  H.R. REP. NO. 111-50, at 3-4 (2009) (authorizing the Justice Department to 
sue for the return of bonuses given to employees of companies that have received more than 
$10 billion from the government on a fraudulent transfer theory and giving the Attorney 
General power to limit executive compensation to ten times the average non-management 
wages as a company would have to do in bankruptcy).  For a discussion of the continuing 
bonus saga, see infra Part VI.B. 
 
 25. See, e.g., Louise Story & Eric Dash, Bankers Reaped Lavish Bonuses During 
Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2009, at A1 (reporting that “nine of the financial firms that 
were among the largest recipients of federal bailout money paid about 5,000 of their traders 
and bankers bonuses of more than $1 million apiece for 2008 . . . . President Obama called 
financial institutions ‘shameful’ for giving themselves nearly $20 billion in bonuses as the 
economy was faltering and the government was spending billions to bail [them] out”). 
 26. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on 
Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1021 (1999) (noting that “[o]utraged 
investors have made their views known to corporate boards of directors using shareholder 
proposals, binding bylaw amendments, ‘Just Vote No’ campaigns, and other activist 
efforts”); Rik Kirkland, The Real CEO Pay Problem, FORTUNE, July 10, 2006, at 78, 80 
(“[T]he outrage has grown so intense that the country’s top CEOs are now vigorously 
debating the problem in private.”); see also Ferri & Maber, supra note 18, at 1 (noting that 
the rapid growth of CEO pay had often made headlines in the British Press (citing Charles 
Arthur, The Fat Cats Are Back, INDEP., July 25, 2000)); BBC NEWS, Glaxo Backs Down on 
CEO Pay Deal, Nov. 26, 2002; BBC NEWS, Vodafone Risks Fury over Boss’s Pay, June 19, 
2002;  Tony Jackson, The Fat Cats Keep Getting Fatter, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1998. 
 27. See generally STEPHEN DEANE, WHAT INTERNATIONAL MARKETS SAY ON PAY—AN 
INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE (Institutional Shareholder Servs.) 2 (2007) (listing other countries 
that have adopted or are considering similar legislation such as Norway, Sweden, Australia, 
and the Netherlands); Stephen Davis, Does ‘Say on Pay’ Work? Lessons on Making CEO 
Compensation Accountable (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors), 
http://millstein.som.yale.edu/Davis_Say_on_Pay_Policy%20Briefing.pdf (discussing how 
the U.S. could benefit from the U.K.’s experience with legislation on advisory voting on 
executive compensation). 
 28. See, e.g., Posting of Ted Allen to RiskMetrics Group, Risk & Governance Blog, A 
“New Opening” for Investors, http://blog.riskmetrics.com/gov/2008/11/a-new-opening-for-
investorssubmitted-by-ted-allen-publications.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2010) (“With the 
election of Barack Obama, investor activists are hopeful that his administration will open 
the door to advisory votes on executive pay, proxy access, broker voting reform, and greater 
attention to environmental and social issues.”); discussion infra Part II.A. 
The debate extends beyond the Capitol to universities across the nation.  Philosophy, 
law, and business scholars have been researching the problem and proposing solutions.  See 
Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note 15, at 1 (“There has also been an explosion in 
academic research on executive compensation.”).  For a summary of the evolving business 
literature and research spanning accounting, economics, finance, industrial relations, 
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As legislatures fight the good fight to curb executive pay packages 
against the interests and designs of political lobbyists, this article suggests a 
role for courts in the reform process.  It proposes a judge-made solution to 
support the regulatory reform effort to help keep corporate executive 
compensation abuses in check.  In particular, it maintains that courts should 
consider applying the equitable doctrine requiring a litigant to have “clean 
hands”29
 
 to bar civil lawsuits by CEOs seeking damages for breach of 
contract against companies that refuse to pay remuneration schemes that 
are excessive by market and/or other standards.  Consideration of the 
defense in this situation would encourage directors to withhold payment 
while simultaneously stymieing executive overreaching and the substantial 
corporate costs that go along with it.  Significantly, the legal evaluation of 
unclean hands in the case of excessive executive compensation is informed  
 
 
organizational behavior, strategy, and executive compensation, see Allen, supra.   
Scholarship from business academics in the last decade has also been extensive.  Sherwin 
Rosen, Contracts and the Market for Executives, in CONTRACT ECONOMICS 181 (Lars Werin 
& Hans Wijkander, eds., 1992); Gerald T. Garvey & Todd T. Milbourn, Asymmetric 
Benchmarking in Compensation: Executives are Rewarded for Good Luck but Not 
Penalized for Bad, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 197 (2006); Henry L. Tosi et al., How Much Does 
Performance Matter? A Meta-analysis of CEO Pay Studies, 26 J. MGMT. 301 (2000); Ravi 
Singh, Board Independence and the Design of Executive Compensation (2006) (Harvard 
Business School Working Paper, on file with authors).  For legal literature addressing 
excessive executive pay, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who 
Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615 (2005); William W. Bratton, The Academic Tournament 
Over Executive Compensation, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1557 (2005); John E. Core et al., Is U.S. 
CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142 (2005); 
Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1 (2000); James McConvill, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance: 
Rising Above the “Pay-for-Performance Principle,” 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 413 (2006).  For 
ethics scholarship addressing executive compensation, see supra notes 19-21. 
 29. See generally T. Leigh Anenson, Beyond Chafee: A Process-Based Theory of 
Unclean Hands 47 AM. BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter Process-based Theory of 
Unclean Hands] (suggesting a four-phase theory of incorporation for the procedural 
protection of the court); T. Leigh Anenson, Limiting Legal Remedies: An Analysis of 
Unclean Hands, 99 KY. L.J. (forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter Limiting Legal Remedies] 
(analyzing and synthesizing cases accepting and rejecting unclean hands in legal cases); T. 
Leigh Anenson, Treating Equity Like Law: A Post-merger Justification of Unclean Hands, 
45 AM. BUS. L.J. 455 (2008) [hereinafter Post-merger Justification of Unclean Hands] 
(proposing merger theory that allows for the incorporation of unclean hands in damages 
actions); see also T. Leigh Anenson, Litigation Between Competitors with Mirror 
Restrictive Covenants: A Formula for Prosecution, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2005) 
(discussing use of equitable defenses and other strategies to preclude competitor challenge 
to validity of employment non-compete agreement); T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity 
in Employment Noncompetition Cases, 42 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 51-52 (2005) (outlining potential 
use of unclean hands and other equitable defenses in the context of employment non-
compete agreements). 
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by the ongoing conversation among legal, business, and ethics scholars and 
attempts an interdisciplinary approach to the problem.30
The equitable maxim of “he [or she] who comes into equity must 
come with clean hands” was developed to “protect the court against the 
odium that would follow its interference to enable a party to profit by his 
[or her] own wrong-doing.”
 
31  Conduct need not be illegal to constitute 
unclean hands and warrant dismissal.32  Behavior that does not conform to 
“minimum ethical standards” in business satisfies the doctrine.33
While there have been countless cases of unclean hands involving 
unethical or immoral conduct in commercial settings over the course of the 
last three centuries,
 
34 no court has considered the defense in the context of 
excessive compensation.  But no court has refused its application either.  
Indeed, no board has attempted to withhold or reduce executive 
compensation schemes.  This article contends that the doctrine could be put 
to good use in cases where executives have engaged in unethical conduct 
and still pursued contract claims without “clean hands.”  It argues that 
courts have discretion in determining whether conduct is unclean as it 
relates to pay at the time of contract formation up until full execution.35
 
 30. See Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note 15, at 1 (“CEO pay research has 
grown even faster than CEO paychecks.”). 
  
Parts II through VI justify uniting and extending the legal, business, and 
 31. N. Pacific Lumber Co. v. Oliver, 596 P.2d 931, 939-40 (Or. 1979) (quoting Henry 
Lacey McClintock, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 63 (1948)). 
 32. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 
815 (1945) (holding that “misconduct need not necessarily have been of such a nature to be 
punishable as a crime or to justify legal proceedings of any character”); Keystone Driller 
Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244-45 (1933) (commenting that unclean hands 
may be invoked on the basis of “conscience, or good faith, or other equitable principle”); 
Deweese v. Reinhard, 165 U.S. 386, 390 (1897) (reasoning that “[a]ny and all misfeasance 
that smacks of injustice may constitute ‘unclean hands’”). 
 33. Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 816; see also Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger 
Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492-94 (1942) (holding that equity may rightly withhold its assistance 
from improper business practices); 4 CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARK & 
MONOPOLY § 23:14 (4th ed. 2001 Supp.) (stating that the doctrine of unclean hands “is of 
special importance in unfair competition cases, for fairness in business . . . is a common 
duty owed by all to all”). 
 34. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Coming Into Equity With Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L. REV. 
877, 878 (1949) [hereinafter Chafee I] (detailing cases involving unethical conduct in 
commercial settings); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Coming Into Equity With Clean Hands, 47 
MICH. L. REV. 1065 (1949) [hereinafter Chafee II] (examining the same such cases as those 
outlined in Chaffee I); see also ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 2 
(1950) (exploring the rules of carrying on utilized by equity courts).  For legal research on 
unclean hands since Chafee’s publications, see supra note 29. 
 35. See infra Part VI.B. (explaining the circumstances under which the defense may 
apply).  If the CEO has been paid an excessive amount (through, for example, a bonus or 
severance package), the company may seek rescission on the basis of unclean hands similar 
to other traditional contract defenses.  See infra Part IV.B and note 225 (discussing how 
several contract defenses derived from equity). 
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ethics literature to defend the use of the unclean hands doctrine under 
circumstances constituting excessive executive compensation. 
Part II explains that the use of the unclean hands is consistent with the 
political will embodied in existing federal law like Sarbanes-Oxley and 
proposed reform measures that include shareholder “say on pay” 
legislation.  Part III maintains that the invocation of unclean hands in 
response to executive overreaching in contract cases strengthens the 
primary role of states as the custodians of corporate integrity and 
governance.  Allowing unclean hands in breach of contract cases brought 
by errant executives sustains the long-established fiduciary duties of 
directors in the corporate law of the several states.  It also supports the new 
duty of good faith recently recognized in Delaware.  The unclean hands 
defense prevents corporate liability for breach of contract and, at the same 
time, possibly avoids personal liability for directors for the lack of good 
faith in the exercise of their management responsibilities. 
Part IV discusses how defeating excessive compensation by applying 
the clean hands doctrine in damages actions preserves the traditional 
purpose and use of the defense to curtail unethical business practices in 
contract cases.  Judicial invocation of unclean hands also continues the 
modern doctrinal trend of extending the defense to damages actions.  It 
additionally reinforces the role of equity in maintaining the integrity of the 
law. 
Part V argues that freedom of contract interests are outweighed by 
fairness concerns in the form of unclean hands in considering executive 
overcompensation by reference to the medieval theory of “just price” and 
modern ideas in business ethics.  It describes the ethical principles 
reinforcing the “clean hands” doctrine and outlines the evolution in ethics 
which supports the notion that both directors and CEOs have moral 
obligations to their companies concerning executive pay. 
Part VI outlines a measure of “excessiveness” that courts can and 
should apply.  It takes as a starting point existing ethical standards as well 
as compensation considerations in corporate legal settings and unites them 
with the economic and other determinants derived from business 
disciplines.  It then illustrates how the defense would work by reference to 
the many real life examples of executive excesses.  The article concludes 
that the application of unclean hands to check compensation abuses is a 
legitimate and effective role for courts in the reform process. 
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II. FEDERAL REGULATORY REFORM 
The use of unclean hands to curb executive compensation abuses is 
consistent with the political will embodied in existing federal law and many 
proposed reform measures.  In particular, these reforms seek shareholder 
“say on pay” as well as greater accountability in general. 
A Shareholder “Say on Pay” Reform 
Shareholder accountability and participation on pay packages have 
been part of the bailout discussions.36  The controversial $700 billion 
government rescue plan enacted as the Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act of 2008 contains executive pay restrictions contingent on the kind of 
government aid received by the corporation.37
Bills have also been introduced in Congress mimicking legislation in 
the United Kingdom and other countries.
 
38
 
 36. See, e.g., Jie Cai & Ralph J. Walkling, Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does It Create 
Value? (2007) (unpublished comment, Drexel University Working Paper, on file with 
authors).  Shareholder “say on pay” is mandatory for companies receiving federal aid under 
TARP and Treasury officials have stated that an advisory vote on executive pay may soon 
be required of all publicly traded companies.  Say on Pay: Are You Ready?, NACD 
DIRECTORS DAILY, July 27, 2009, at 2.  Scholars have also recommended similar non-
binding shareholder votes on executive compensation issues as a matter of state statutory 
reform.  See Loewenstein, supra note 28, at 28; Thomas & Martin, supra note 26, at 1043-
48; cf. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There’s a Problem, What’s the 
Remedy? The Case for “Compensation Discussion and Analysis,” 30 J. CORP. L. 675, 702 
(2005) (arguing for a Compensation Discussion and Analysis signed by the compensation 
committee members and submitted to the shareholders for approval). 
  Legislation was enacted by the 
 37. See supra note 14 (discussing reform measures for excessive executive 
compensation).  Enacted in response to our current financial crisis, the EESA effectively 
allows the Treasury to buy mortgage-related “troubled” assets and invest in banks and 
insurance companies to shore up their capital.  See also A Year of the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 10, 2008, available at 
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2008/10/10/dow_1year (demonstrating that by the 
close of trading on Friday, October 10, 2008, the Dow Jones had lost 39.4% of its value 
from a year earlier); The Dow Jones Industrials’ Moves since Lehman Fall, LAS VEGAS SUN, 
Sept. 9, 2009, available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/sep/09/the-dow-jones-
industrials-moves-since-lehman-fall/ (reporting that the week following the emergency 
legislation, the Dow Jones industrial average dropped each day, for a total six-day loss of 
2,031.65 points). 
 38. See Ferri & Maber, supra note 18 (noting binding shareholder say on pay legislation 
in Norway, Sweden, Australia, and the Netherlands).  In April 2007, the House of 
Representatives approved a bill seeking to introduce a say on pay rule.  H.R. 1257, 110th 
Cong. (2007).  An analogous bill was introduced in the Senate by then-presidential 
candidate Barack Obama.  S. 1181, 110th Cong. (2007); Stephen Taub, Obama Pushes Say 
On Pay, Apr. 11, 2008, available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/11037327/c_11036422; 
Posting of L. Reed Walton to Risk & Governance Blog, U.S. Senate Takes up “Say on Pay” 
Bill , http://blog.riskmetrics.com/gov/2007/04/us-senate-takes-up-say-on-pay-billsubmitted-
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UK government in 2002 in response to investors concerned with the 
adoption of controversial U.S.-style compensation practices.39  The law 
mandates an annual, advisory shareholder vote on the executive 
compensation report prepared by the board of directors and has been 
successful in increasing the dialogue between shareholders and 
management.40
Additionally, some U.S. firms have voluntarily adopted “say on pay” 
practices and others will likely follow.
 
41
 
by-l-reed-walton-staff-writer.html (Apr. 30. 2007); cf. H.R. 4291, 109th Cong. (2005) 
(requiring shareholder approval of compensation and golden parachute plans).  For other 
reforms, see Martin, infra note 67, at 532. 
  Given the negative view of 
 39. Have Fat Cats Had Their Day?, THE ECONOMIST, May 24, 2003, at 63.  For a 
comparison of U.S. and UK executive pay, see Martin J. Conyon et al., Are US CEOs Paid 
More Than UK CEOs? Inferences From Risk-Adjusted Pay (The University of 
Pennsylvania Working Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=907469; Martin J. 
Conyon & Kevin J. Murphy, The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United States and 
United Kingdom, 110 ECON. J. 640 (2000) (finding that in 1997 CEOs in the U.S. earned 
45% higher cash compensation and 190% higher total compensation than CEOs in the UK).   
For a comprehensive international comparison between CEOs in twelve OECD countries, 
see John M. Abowd & Michael L. Bognanno, International Differences in Executive and 
Managerial Compensation, in DIFFERENCES AND CHANGES IN WAGE STRUCTURES 67 
(Richard B. Freeman & Lawrence F. Katz eds., 1995) (assessing data from 1984 to 1992 
and finding U.S. CEO compensation exceeds that for CEOs in Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom). 
 40. See Ferri & Maber, supra note 18 (concluding that the policy objectives of the 
legislation are being met, at least with respect to those companies with the most egregious 
pay practices); see also William Hutchings & Mike Foster, Shareholder Voting Gets Rethink 
in U.K., WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2009, at C5 (discussing proposed reforms to engage 
shareholders in the long-term fiscal health of the firms in which they invest); cf. Jeffrey N. 
Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the Case For 
Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. LEGIS. 323 (2009) (proposing a federal legislative provision 
of a shareholder right to decide whether a public firm should opt in to an advisory 
shareholder vote regime to clarify and unify existing state and federal law instead of the 
proposed mandatory rule).  The Wall Street Journal reported that Royal Dutch Shell PLC is 
the largest among a growing group of British companies whose shareholders have voted 
down compensation plans in advisory votes.  Guy Chazan & Joann S. Lublin, Shell 
Investors Revolt Over Executive Pay Plan, WALL ST. J., May 20, 2009, at B1; see also 
Gordon, supra (comparing CEO compensation of Royal Dutch Shell PLC, Europe’s largest 
oil company, and Exxon Mobil Corp., the largest U.S. oil company, and reporting that 
European investors are angry over bonuses—$1.76 versus $17.6 million—that are relatively 
modest by U.S. standards). 
 41. For instance, only days after the election of Barack Obama on November 4, 2008, 
companies such as Sun Microsystems and Motorola voluntarily adopted “say on pay.”  Ferri 
& Weber, supra note 3.  Between 2006 and 2008, proposals for the adoption of say on pay 
had a high degree of support in compensation-related proposals.  See Thomas & Martin, 
supra note 26, at 1025 (stating that there is an average of 40% in favor); Marilyn F. Johnson 
& Margaret B. Shackell, Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation (Michigan 
State University Working Paper, Apr. 1997) (on file with authors) (examining the success of 
“say on pay” proposals in the years 1992-95); see also Ferri & Weber, supra note 3, at 4 
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executive compensation post-Enron, there has been a significant increase in 
the frequency of pay-related proposals.42  Shareholder activism aimed at 
affecting the pay setting process like “say on pay” has had the highest 
voting support and implementation rate compared to other proposals 
concerning compensation.43  These initiatives, albeit aimed at targeted 
firms, also influence the policy-making debate.44
B. Sarbanes-Oxley Legislation 
 
Moreover, five years before the reform bills targeted executive 
compensation, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) attempted to 
strengthen corporate accountability to shareholders.45
 
(listing the 2008 shareholder proposals for say on pay).  Prominent investor TIAA-CREF 
has voted in favor of these measures.  Thomas & Martin, supra note 26, at 1044.  
Shareholder activists led by AFSCME (a union pension fund) also targeted more than 150 
US firms with non-binding shareholder proposals requesting the adoption of “say on pay.”  
Ferri & Maber, supra note 18, at 2 n.2. 
  Then-President Bush 
described the statute as “the most far-reaching reforms of American 
 42. See Yonca Ertimur et al., Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay, 11, 31 (working 
paper, Apr. 2009) (on file with authors) (analyzing a sample of 134 vote-no campaigns and 
1,198 shareholder proposals related to executive pay between 1997 and 2007). 
 43. Id. at 31.  In addition to “say on pay,” process-oriented proposals include the ability 
to expense stock options and a requirement to receive approval for golden parachutes.  Id. at 
11.  Other kinds of compensation-related proposals seek to influence the outcome (i.e., 
performance-based vesting conditions) or objectives (i.e., link pay to social criteria) of the 
pay setting process.  See id. at 9-10 (characterizing such proposals as “pay design” and “pay 
philosophy”). 
 44. Id. at 15, 25-26.  Studies suggest that giving shareholders a greater voice in the 
boardroom by an advisory vote on executive compensation further aligns owner-manager 
interests, at least for those companies with inefficient executive compensation and relatively 
poor corporate governance.  Cai & Walkling, supra note 36, at 1 (“[S]uggest[ing] that the 
market views say-on-pay as value-creating for the companies with inefficient executive 
compensation and relatively poor corporate governance but value-destroying for other 
companies.”).  The success of such initiatives, however, has had little effect on the reduction 
in CEO compensation overall.  Ertimur et al., supra note 42, at 31.  Nevertheless, studies 
have found that other proposals seeking to influence the pay setting procedures as well pay 
design have reduced CEO pay.  See Fabrizio Ferri & Tatiana Sandino, The Impact of 
Shareholder Activism on Financial Reporting and Compensation: The Case of Employee 
Stock Options Expensing, 84 ACCT. REV. 433, 456 (2009) (reporting a $2.3 million reduction 
in total CEO pay in firms after approval of proposals to expense employee stock options); 
Ertimur, supra note 42, at 30 (demonstrating a causal link between labor union sponsored 
proposals involving the design of executive pay like those linking pay and performance 
from 2002-07 and a reduction in CEO pay by $1.5 million in firms with excess pay); see 
also Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm 
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1770 (2008) (finding a $1 million CEO pay decline in firms 
targeted by hedge fund activists). 
 45. Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745-810 (codified at scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 
U.S.C.). 
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business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.”46  In 
signing the bill into law, he emphasized:  “[T]his law says to every 
American:  There will not be a different ethical standard for corporate 
America than the standard that applies to everyone else.”47  Generally, 
SOX and other post-scandal reforms of the stock exchanges and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) attempt to cure systemic 
failures of corporate governance caused by faulty internal financial controls 
and the lack of board independence.48  It is an effort to make management 
more accountable, along with other gatekeepers and advisors, after 
persistent and repeated “corporate looting by insiders”.49
As it relates to executive compensation, SOX prohibits loans to senior 
officers.
 
50  If the corporation is required to file an accounting restatement 
due to misconduct, SOX mandates that CEOs and CFOs return bonuses, 
incentives, equity-based compensation, and certain profits from the sales of 
securities.51
 
 46. President George W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, in 
38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 183 (July 30, 2002). 
  It also prohibits executive officers from trading in the equity 
 47. Id. 
 48. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas: The 
Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 79, 86-87 (2005) (discussing the new role of the federal government in corporate 
governance matters); LAUFER, supra note 8, at 39 (summarizing SOX provisions and the 
reasons for them).  Among other things, SOX requires the verification of financial 
statements by CEOs and CFOs under threat of criminal sanction.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 
7241 (2002) (requiring that company officers verify financial statements), 15 U.S.C. § 78m 
(2002) (requiring that company officers verify financial statements or face criminal 
penalties).  It further directs the SEC and other federal agencies to promulgate additional 
rules and regulations.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7233 (2002) (directing SEC to issue regulations 
pertaining to audit procedures and creditor independence); 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002) 
(directing the SEC to issue rules pertaining to professional responsibility of attorneys 
practicing before the SEC).  The internal financial controls provisions of SOX are part of a 
broader mandate for issuers to establish and maintain disclosure controls and procedures to 
ensure the quality of information in public reports.  Some argue that the costs of the statute’s 
internal financial control provisions outweigh its benefits.  Henry N. Butler & Larry E. 
Ribstein, The Sarbanes-Oxley Debacle: What We’ve Learned; How to Fix It, 38-42 (Mar. 
13, 2006) (unpublished research paper prepared for the American Enterprise Institute, The 
Liability Project). 
 49. LAUFER, supra note 8, at 39 n.272 (citing Richard Posner, The Economics of 
Business Scandals and Financial Regulation (Oct. 2002) (unpublished manuscript)).  See 
generally Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the “Expectations Gap” in Investor Protection: 
The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1153-54 (2003) 
(discussing investor protection and corporate integrity as the central theme of reform). 
 50. Sarbanes-Oxley allows loans to officers made in the ordinary course of business.  
15 U.S.C. § 78m(k). 
 51. 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a) (“If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement 
due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any 
financial reporting requirement under the securities laws, the chief executive officer and 
chief financial officer of the company shall reimburse the issuer . . . .”). 
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securities of their companies during an employee fund blackout period.52  
Additionally, SOX grants the SEC authority to freeze corporate assets to 
prevent the payment of bonuses to executives involving financial fraud.53  
Finally, it gives the SEC authority over board composition and committee 
structure as well as the power to prohibit executives from serving as 
corporate officers through administrative proceedings.54
SOX’s panoply of prescriptions and requirement of reimbursement, 
however, have had (at best) limited influence in preventing officers from 
benefitting at the expense of their companies.  The lack of enforcement of 
the clawback provisions that mandate a return of executive pay in the event 
of a restatement is particularly significant.
 
55  Since its enactment, there 
have been thousands of restatements and only twice has the SEC forced 
executives to return their unfair share.56  Moreover, both cases involved 
participation by the officer in the misconduct and alleged fraud.57  In a 
recent (third) lawsuit, however, the SEC appears to be taking a more 
aggressive approach to its clawback authority and has sought the forfeiture 
of bonuses and stock sale profits from a former CEO after false accounting 
by other executives caused the company to inflate earnings that led to a 
restatement.58
 
 52. 15 U.S.C. § 7244 (2002). 
  Shareholders have also instituted private lawsuits to fulfill 
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (2002). 
 54. 15 U.S. C. § 78j-l (2002); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(f). 
 55. See Rachael E. Schwartz, The Clawback Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley: An 
Underutilized Incentive to Keep the Corporate House Clean, 64 BUS. LAW. 1, 5 (2008) 
(advising that the largest portion of a CEO or CFO’s compensation, whether incentive-based 
or equity-based, is potentially subject to section 304 (citing The WSJ 350: A Survey of CEO 
Compensation, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2007, at R1 and C.E.O. Pay: The New Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at BU10)). 
 56. Schwartz, supra note 55, at 2; see also id. at 13-14 (relaying that the SEC obtained 
a “clawback” under this provision of $400 million in stock profits and incentive 
compensation from William McGuire, the former CEO of UnitedHealth Group Inc. in 2007 
and $190,000 in cash bonuses from Frances M. Jewels, former CFO of Sycamore Networks, 
Inc. in 2008).  The SEC has power under the securities laws (pre-SOX) to disgorge not only 
profits but the base salary of the CEO.  Id. at 32-33.  Nevertheless, under this clawback 
power, courts require the SEC to show that the misstatement resulted in the executive 
obtaining money that he or she otherwise would not have received.  Id. at 15.  Executive 
bonuses under SOX can be clawed back without regard to causation.  Id. 
 57. Id. at 13-14.  Both cases involved stock options backdating.  Id. 
 58. See Phred Dvorak, SEC Orders Former CSK Auto Chief To Return Pay, WALL ST. 
J., July 24, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124831208417074457.html (describing 
lawsuit filed against Maynard Jenkins seeking the return of two years of performance-based 
compensation paid as the result of falsely inflated earnings); David Scheer et al., SEC 
Demands Ex-CSK Chief Forfeit Pay in Landmark Case (Update1), BLOOMBERG, July 23, 
2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aqI28XZcPPHw 
(predicting that the lawsuit against former CEO not involved in wrongdoing will up the ante 
for other companies facing potential restatements).  Rachael E. Schwartz, Senior Counsel 
for the SEC’s Enforcement Division, criticized the SEC’s stringent reading of the statutory 
language and argued for an expansive enforcement policy requiring repayment regardless of 
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the statutory policy of restitution, but they have been universally rebuffed 
by the federal courts.59
C. Federal Securities Law 
 
The disclosure provisions of federal securities legislation have a 
similar purpose:  to deter abusive practices by corporate managers such as 
excessive compensation.60  The SEC has regulated the disclosure of 
executive pay packages since the securities laws were enacted and 
continues to update and increase the disclosed amount of executive 
compensation data.61
 
scienter, knowledge, or any participation in the wrongdoing.  See generally Schwartz, supra 
note 55 (describing SOX obligations for executive compensation); see also id. at 5 (noting 
that section 304 explicitly authorizes the SEC to create an exemption for any circumstance 
in which the proposed application of section 304 might cause injustice such as when a CEO 
is powerless to prevent the wrong doing of low-level employees).  For an alternative view, 
see John Patrick Kelsh, Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Case for a 
Personal Culpability Requirement, 59 BUS. LAW. 1005 (2004) (describing the potential for 
personal liability in executive compensation cases). 
  In addition to reorganizing the mandated 
 59. Neither the company nor any of its shareholders can sue to enforce section 304; 
only the SEC may bring an action.  Schwartz, supra note 55, at 2; see also id. at 2 n.4 (citing 
lower district court cases rejecting a private cause of action under the clawback provision of 
Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 60. See Jerry W. Markham, Regulating Excessive Executive Compensation—Why 
Bother?, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 277, 284 (2007) (“One of the federal securities’ laws’ 
principal targets of reform was excess executive compensation.”); see also George T. 
Washington, The Corporate Executive’s Living Wage, 54 HARV. L. REV. 733, 734-35 (1941) 
(depicting how corporate executives increased their salaries to compensate for the reduction 
in bonuses after the 1929 stock market crash while laying off thousands of workers).  One of 
the architects of the 1933 Securities Act, Felix Frankfurter, explained its intended “in 
terrorem” effect: 
The existence of bonuses, of excessive commissions and salaries, of preferential 
lists and the like, may all be open secrets among the knowing, but the knowing 
are few. There is a shrinking quality to such transactions; to force knowledge of 
them into the open is largely to restrain their happening. 
Felix Frankfurter, Securities Act—Social Consequences, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 55. 
 61. The SEC’s authority over executive compensation stems from Sections 3(b), 6, 7, 
10, and 19(a) of the 1933 Securities Act, as amended, Sections 10(b), 12, 13, 14, 15(d) and 
23(a) of the 1934 Exchange Act, as amended, and Sections 8, 20(a), 24(a), 30 and 38 of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended.  71 Fed. Reg. at 6598 (Feb. 8, 2006).  The 
SEC first regulated executive pay disclosures in 1938.  Exchange Act Release No. 34-1823 
(Aug. 11, 1938).  The 1992 Regulations included a Performance Graph and Compensation 
Committee Report which detailed compensation and corporate performance, as reflected in 
the stock price.  Executive Compensation Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6962, 
57 Fed. Reg. 48126 (Oct. 21, 1992); Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securityholder 
Lists and Mailing Requests, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7032, 58 Fed. Reg. 63010, at sec. 
II (commenting that amendments were intended to make compensation disclosure clearer, 
more comprehensive and useful to shareholders).  The 1996 Regulations are discussed infra 
notes 63-65 and accompanying text. 
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compensation materials, the most recent regulations require that 
management reveal retirement and severance packages and outstanding 
equity interests.62  The regulations also establish a minimum federal 
threshold of $10,000 as a trigger for disclosing perks.63  In the words of 
SEC Chairman Cox, its job is “to help investors keep an eye on how much 
of their money is being paid to top executives who work for them.”64
Nevertheless, the SEC focuses on wage information, not wage 
controls (which it leaves to state corporate law).
 
65  While the SEC may 
enforce the disclosure requirements against companies for misleading 
compensation information, it does not set CEO compensation or provide a 
formula for determining it.66
Consequently, notwithstanding the value of increased transparency, 
critics have challenged the SEC to undertake a more meaningful role in 
policing compensation decisions.
 
67
 
 62. 71 Fed. Reg. 53,183-89 (Jan. 3, 2006) (summarizing the regulations). 
  Given that the regulations do not 
 63. Id.; Press Release, SEC, SEC Votes to Adopt Changes to Disclosure Requirements 
Concerning Executive Compensation and Related Matters (July 26, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-123.htm.  Along with compensation matters, the 
regulations also address related party transactions, director independence, and corporate 
governance.  71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Jan. 3, 2005). 
 64. Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Speech by SEC Chairman: Chairman’s Opening 
Statement; Proposed Revisions to the Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure 
Rules (Jan. 17, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch011706cc.htm. 
 65. Id.  Chairman Cox explains:  “It is [the shareholders’ and directors’] job, not the 
government’s, to determine how best to align executive compensation with corporation 
performance, to determine the appropriate levels of executive pay, and to decide on the 
metrics for determining it.”  Id; see also Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information 
Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 418 
(2003) (discussing the limits of increased disclosure in that it assumes there is an ability to 
use the information); Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws: 
Opting Out of Securities Regulation by Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519, 
534 (1999) (noting that disclosure has been the central focus of the federal agency 
structure).  
 66. Id.; see also SEC Release, supra note 63 (SEC questioning the effectiveness of its 
regulations that require corporations to furnish compensation reports rather than file them 
such that Exchange Act liability for misstatements would attach).  For SEC enforcement 
actions, see, e.g., U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2005 Performance and 
Accountability Report, at 2, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar2005.shtml 
(noting settlement with Tyson Foods and its former CEO, Donald Tyson, who collectively 
paid a penalty of $2.2 million for misleading disclosures of compensation information).  
There are still ample reports of companies disguising executive pay packages.  See, e.g., 
Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Stealth Compensation Via Retirement Benefits, 1 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 291 (2004) (advising that corporate boards have been camouflaging 
compensation through retirement benefits and other payments); Patrick McGeehan, Options 
in the Mirror, Bigger Than They Seem, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2006, sec. 3, at 6 (commenting 
on how Lehman Brothers obscured executive compensation through stock option grants and 
valuation). 
 67. See Jennifer S. Martin, The House of Mouse and Beyond: Assessing the SECs 
Efforts to Regulate Executive Compensation, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 481 (2007) (urging the 
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provide a remedy for shareholders who object to compensation practices, 
commentators conclude that current SEC regulations are incapable of 
solving the executive pay problem.68
In lieu of government enforcement, private lawsuits are available 
under the securities laws for misleading disclosures.  Such lawsuits offer 
another means of enforcing officer accountability for financial 
misconduct.
 
69  The availability of a private right to sue “encourages 
investors, bolsters capital markets, and facilitates economic growth.”70
While there is ongoing debate about the impact of private litigation 
upon capital markets,
 
71 liabilities for securities fraud have become a 
globally accepted phenomenon.72
 
SEC to go further than its longstanding disclosure approach to executive compensation 
based on the broad protections for board decisions over compensation under state corporate 
law); cf. Philip C. Berg, The Limits of SEC Authority Under Section 14(a) of the Exchange 
Act: Where Federal Disclosure Ends and State Corporate Governance Begins, 17 J. CORP. 
L. 311 (1992) (discussing ways the SEC can undertake proxy reform). 
  In particular, foreign securities regimes 
 68. Markham, supra note 60; Martin, supra note 67; see also Lucien Bebchuk, The 
SEC: Beyond Disclosure, FORBES, Jan. 19, 2006, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/2006/01/18/sec-executive-comp-comment-cx_lb_0119bebchuk.html 
(asserting that requirements by the SEC that companies disclose executive compensation 
schemes will not fix the problem of executive compensation alone).  There has been an 
extensive and longstanding discussion about the merits of disclosure as opposed to direct 
conduct controls.  See Alison Grey Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities 
Regulation: A Brief Review, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 311, 325 (1974) (arguing that substantive 
regulation is the best means of deterring undesirable practices); John C. Coffee Jr., Beyond 
the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective 
Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1115 (1977) (“Disinfectants are not, after all, a 
universal panacea; sometimes surgery is required.”); William O. Douglas, Protecting the 
Investor, 23 YALE L.J. 522, 528 (1934) (noting the effectiveness of conduct regulation).  
The tax laws have also been criticized as ineffective in checking executive compensation.   
Markham, supra note 60, at 287-91; see also Sarah Anderson et al., Executive Excess 2008: 
How Average Taxpayers Subsidize Runaway Pay, INST. FOR POL’Y STUD. & UNITED FOR A 
FAIR ECON, Aug. 25, 2008, at 5 (finding that tax subsidies related to executive pay total $20 
billion and that Congressional reforms targeting the loopholes have stalled in the face of 
opposition from corporate lobby groups). 
 69. There is a right to sue under section 10(b).  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2002), 17 C.F.R. 
§240.10b-5(2007).  See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1988) (“Judicial 
interpretation and application, legislative acquiescence, and the passage of time have 
removed any doubt that a private cause of action exists for a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5, and constitutes an essential tool for enforcement of the 1934 Act’s requirements.”). 
 70. See Robert A. Prentice, Stoneridge, Securities Fraud Litigation, and the Supreme 
Court, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 611, 681 (2008) (reporting results of an empirical study (citing 
FRANK B. CROSS & ROBERT A. PRENTICE, LAW AND CORPORATE FINANCE 182 (2007))); id. at 
680 n.305 (showing there is extensive literature arguing that robust securities regimes 
facilitate capital markets and spur economic growth). 
 71. See id. at 678 (finding the “case for encouraging such suits is no less persuasive 
than the case for discouraging them”). 
 72. See Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 
832-38 (2006) (showing that developed economies emulate most of the core attributes of 
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have been sensitive to the need for executive accountability.73  This 
worldwide concern reflects President Roosevelt’s belief that the securities 
laws were for the “protection of investors [and] for the safeguarding of 
values.”74
Yet recent scandals involving collateralized debt obligations and 
options backdating have challenged the effectiveness of securities laws.
 
75  
Amidst urgent calls for accountability to shareholders, federal courts are 
struggling to fashion an analytically sound rubric of liability in civil 
securities fraud suits.76  To make matters worse, a recent decision by the 
U.S. Supreme Court has signaled that federal courts are limiting liability 
exposure in the securities arena.77
 
U.S. securities regulation). 
  As a result, courts will not invent 
 73. See Jennifer G. Hill, Regulatory Responses to Global Corporate Scandals, 23 WISC. 
INT’L L.J. 367, 401-02 (2005) (discussing Australia’s increase in executive accountability); 
Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud As Corporate Governance: 
Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 876-77 (2003) (describing federal 
disclosure laws in the United States that impose governance duties on corporate officers). 
 74. 78 CONG. REC. 2264 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1934) (Message From Pres. Roosevelt) 
(providing reasons for the enactment of the Exchange Act of 1934); see also Prentice, supra 
note 70, at 682 (“President Roosevelt perceived securities regulation as largely a moral 
question rather than an economic one.” (citing JAMES E. SARGEANT, ROOSEVELT AND THE 
HUNDRED DAYS: STRUGGLE FOR THE EARLY NEW DEAL 221 (1981)))). 
 75. See, e.g., Jay R. Ritter, Forensic Finance, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 127 (2008). 
 76. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Reform of Joint and Several Liability Under the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Proportionate Liability, Contribution 
Rights, and Settlement Effects, 51 BUS. LAW. 1157, 1165-66 (1996) (noting the fine line 
between levels of intent).  Two types of securities litigation are typical: insider trading and 
misleading disclosures.  In the latter case, a corporate officer makes a false or misleading 
statement about an important product line or financial matter such as quarterly earnings in 
the corporation’s favor that inflates the stock price.  When the truth is discovered, a class of 
investors sues the corporation and key officers for fraud under Section 10(b) of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.  Under either scenario, scholars are attempting to 
make sense of contradictory court decisions.  See generally Patricia S. Abril & Ann M. 
Olazábal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81 (suggesting that 
the scienter may reside other than with the officer who utters the misrepresentation); Regina 
F. Burch, “Unfit to Serve” Post-Enron, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1081, 1084 (2008) (arguing that 
non-management directors’ reckless failures to respond to red flags may amount to an 
intentional omission of material information in violation of Rule 10b-5); Hugh C. Beck, The 
Substantive Limits of Liability for Inaccurate Predictions, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 161 (2007) 
(advocating a falsity-driven analysis of the PSLRA’s safe harbor’s “meaningful cautionary 
statements” requirement); Ann M. Olazábal & Patricial S. Abril, The Ubiquity of Greed: A 
Contextual Model for Analysis of Scienter, 60 FLA. L. REV. 401 (2008) (extending the stock 
sales model to create a rubric for consideration of adequacy of allegations of motive and 
opportunity in 10b-5 complaints). 
 77. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, v. Scientific-Atlantic, 55 U.S. 148 (2008) (refusing to 
recognize liability for knowing participation in securities fraud by parties who make no 
misleading statements upon which the public could have relied under Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5); see also Tony Mauro, Justices Skeptical of Investor Class Actions, LEGAL 
TIMES, Oct. 15, 2007 (calling it “the securities fraud case of the decade”); Nicholas 
ANENSONFINALIZED_ONE_UPDATED 9/9/2010  4:46 PM 
968 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:4 
 
liabilities to capture fraud as they once did.78  One commentator has 
concluded that the Court’s decision was clear that federal courts are to sit 
on the sidelines despite the ever artful and creative business methods that 
have, and will continue, to breed new instances of fraud or other financial 
misconduct.79  Congress alone must now act swiftly and with prescience to 
provide adequate investor protection.80
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s stance vis-à-vis securities 
legislation parallels its recent refusal to recognize remedies in other 
commercial cases.
 
81
 
Rummell, Supremes to Weigh in on Vendor Liability for Fraud, FIN. WK., Oct. 8, 2007, 
available at 
http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071008/REG/71005025 
(characterizing the case as “the Roe v. Wade of securities law”). 
  The effect of this jurisprudence is to further 
 78. See Prentice, supra note 70, at 639-40 (reviewing prior securities fraud litigation as 
well as other fraud jurisprudence to show that neither the Supreme Court nor state or lower 
federal courts distinguished between primary and secondary liability).  Robert Prentice 
explains:  “These ‘A helps B fool C’ schemes are hardly new inventions.  Until Stoneridge, 
they had always been punished rather than rationalized as typical business operations.”  Id. 
at 615. 
 79. See id. at 677 (noting that a “stinting definition of fraud provides crooks with a road 
map for getting away with the most egregious of schemes”); accord John C. Coffee, Jr., The 
Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story of the ‘Evolution’ of a White-Collar Crime, 
21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1983) (“If we freeze the evolution of the [mail fraud] statute,  
new forms of predatory behavior will appear to which the legislature cannot realistically be 
expected to respond quickly.”); see also Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 20 (explaining that the 
complexities of securities can make financial markets more susceptible to fraud); cf. Samuel 
W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1972 (2006) (commenting on the 
flexibility of legislative and common law fraud given that it “will always confront novel 
economic practices that have not previously been classified as fraudulent”). 
 80. See Prentice, supra note 70, at 612-13 (criticizing those praising the decision for its 
judicial restraint (citing Paul S. Atkins, Stoneridge and the Rule of Law, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
25, 2008, at A14)). 
 81. See Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) 
(denying an insurance company equitable relief in the form of forcing another party to pay 
money since such a remedy would be a legal one); Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. 
Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 324 (1999) (reversing a trial court’s grant of 
injunctive relief on the basis that such relief exceeded the trial court’s jurisdiction); see also 
Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal 
Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 224, 253–55 (2003) (criticizing the court’s restrictive reading of its 
own power in relationship to Congress and explaining that the Grupo Mexico and Great-
West Life cases are part of a jurisprudential trend in other areas); accord The Supreme 
Court, Term—Leading Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 200, 317 (1999) (characterizing the Grupo 
Mexico decision as a “cramped understanding” of the powers of federal courts).  While 
these two decisions involved equitable remedies and have generated commentary on the 
perceived power of the federal courts over equity, Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the 
Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations on Federal Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291 (2000) (critiquing Grupo Mexico and emphasizing the 
interdependence of law and equity in social progress), more recent decisions sanctioning 
dismissals on the basis of discretionary equitable defenses demonstrate that the Supreme 
Court’s position on remedies has less to do with equity and more to do with its place within 
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discourage Congress from looking to federal courts as a means of enforcing 
a national agenda. 
Given the more limited role of the federal courts in protecting 
investors from fraudsters (or from adequately responding in other business 
disputes) as well as the SEC’s narrow mandate regarding executive pay 
packages, state courts should continue to “step into the breach” left by 
federal law in their time-honored role as guardians of public policy.82  As 
discussed below in Part III, there is controversy over the effectiveness of 
state court litigation concerning excessive executive compensation.83
III. STATE CORPORATION LAW 
  
Combating executive pay abuses in the context of an unclean hands defense 
would help fulfill the promise of state courts as the primary purveyors of 
public policy and assist existing and proposed federal law in reaching its 
goals of shareholder and stakeholder accountability.  Therefore, the 
doctrine of “clean hands” provides a more complete response to executive 
compensation schemes that are potentially lethal to companies and their 
constituents. 
Dismissals for unclean hands in breach of contract cases, brought by 
errant executives, support the long-standing view of holding state law as 
the primary regulator of the corporation.84
 
the federal political system.  Accord Prentice, supra note 70, at 612-13 (concluding that the 
court’s decision in Stoneridge was “an activist opinion driven primarily by undisguised and 
quite debatable policy preferences”); Resnik, supra, at 225 (characterizing, in a similar 
manner, the Court’s jurisprudence as motivated by judicial policy preferences).  See 
generally Robert J. Aalberts & T. Leigh Anenson, Discretionary Limits on Statutes of 
Limitations: A Defense of Laches (working paper, on file with authors) (analyzing Supreme 
Court equity cases). 
  Corporations are not only 
created under state law, but their internal affairs are also governed by state 
 82. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of the New Century: Common Law Courts 
Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 11-13 (1995) (discussing how 
state courts are answering Justice Brennan’s call to “step into the breach” and interpreting 
their state constitutions more expansively than the federal constitution in the inaugural 
Brennan Lecture delivered at the New York University School of Law (quoting William J. 
Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 
489, 503 (1977))). 
 83. See infra Part III; cf. LAUFER, supra note 8, at 40 (discussing how New York state 
criminal law closed the regulatory gaps of federal law in the area of excessive executive 
compensation during the post-Enron era). 
 84. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (“Corporations are creatures of state law, 
and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except 
where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to 
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.”); see also Martin, 
supra note 67, at 537 (“Challenges to executive compensation decision making logically 
reside in state law . . . .”). 
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statutory default rules.85  Moreover, a well-developed body of state case 
law regulates the relationship between shareholders and management.86  
Because states have not amended corporate statutory provisions to address 
abusive executive pay practices, litigation challenging the strength of the 
owner-management connection has been the primary means of correcting 
executive compensation.87  Typically, such lawsuits are brought by 
shareholders on behalf of the corporation and seek to hold directors 
personally liable for waste and breaching their fiduciary duties.88
It is axiomatic that corporate directors have a direct fiduciary 
relationship with the entities they serve and an indirect fiduciary 
relationship with the shareholders.
 
89  One of the most important purposes of 
corporate fiduciary law is to instill trust in management behavior for the 
benefit of the shareholders and the public.90
 
 85. Suggestions for state statutory reform to curb excessive executive compensation 
have included shareholder approval (binding or nonbinding) of executive compensation 
packages or at least of contracts with such specific features, allowance for shareholder 
resolutions on executive pay policies that are binding on the board, and permitting greater 
shareholder involvement in the selection of directors.  LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. 
FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION 198 (2004).  There is also the possibility of establishing corporate bylaws 
concerning executive compensation.  Thomas & Martin, supra note 26, at 1047-49. 
  Invocation of unclean hands in 
 86. See Duggin & Goldman, supra note 12 (discussing the development of fiduciary 
duty law). 
 87. In response to an earlier Delaware decision, Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 
(Del. 1985), Delaware and other states have amended their general corporation law to 
permit corporations to include a provision in their certificate of incorporation to exculpate 
directors from personal liability for breaching their duty of care (although not their duty of 
loyalty or the newly recognized duty of good faith).  For example, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).  Van Gorkom, and subsequent cases like In re Walt Disney Co., infra 
notes 96-102, have received a high level of scholarly attention due to the implications of 
their holdings.  See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in 
Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 54 (2002) (discussing the role of a corporation’s 
board from a legal and practical perspective). 
 88. Martin, supra note 67; see also John W. Murrey, III, Excessive Compensation in 
Publicly Held Corporations: Is the Doctrine of Waste Still Applicable?, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 
433 (2005) (discussing the waste doctrine in the context of excessive executive 
compensation). 
 89. See Duggin & Goldman, supra note 12, at 257-58 (“Shareholders entrust control of 
their property to the directors who are charged with overall management of the corporation. 
They expect those who manage the companies they invest in to produce value, and they 
anticipate a share in the benefit derived from their capital.” (citing Lawrence E. Mitchell, 
Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425, 430 (1993))). 
 90. Mitchell, supra note 89, at 430; see also Larry Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. 
REV. 553, 556 (2001) (“Trust can be seen simply as a decision by one person to give power 
over his person or property to another in exchange for a return promise.”).  Mitchell notes 
that in the corporate context, “[t]he power and control that are present in all fiduciary 
relationships are exaggerated . . . because the indeterminate length of the enterprise and the 
practically infinite array of investment opportunities for the corporation make any 
possibility of specified limitations on directors’ power or ongoing control by the 
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response to executive overreaching in contract cases strengthens the 
primary role of states as the custodian of corporate integrity and 
governance.91  It also represents a complementary response to the current 
crisis of corporate trust and supports state fiduciary duty law.92  Fiduciary 
duties are rooted in ancient equity and are often emphasized with respect to 
the importance of the preservation of equity in the modern commercial 
world.93
Still, the saga of shareholder derivative litigation has not been a 
surefire way to cure executive excesses.  During the Great Depression, the 
first in a series of high profile cases challenged the outrageous 
compensation packages paid to industry moguls as a breach of directorial 
duties and showed some promise in stemming excessive executive pay.
 
94  
Such lawsuits have been ongoing ever since, especially during recessionary 
periods like now, when CEO paychecks outpace those of the average 
worker and corporate earnings.95
 
stockholders unrealistic.”  Id. 
 
 91. See Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1233, 1235 (2003) (commenting that Enron “serves as a ‘perfect storm’ metaphor 
that the checks and balances in the American system of corporate governance are not 
working . . . .”).  For articles discussing the pros and cons of directorial fiduciary duties, see 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1267-68 
(1999); Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ 
Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 394 (2005); Charles 
Hansen, The ALI Corporate Governance Project: Of the Duty of Due Care and the Business 
Judgment Rule, A Commentary, 41 BUS. LAW. 1237, 1245 (1986); E. Norman Veasey, A 
Perspective on Liability Risks to Directors in Light of Current Events, INSIGHTS, Feb. 2005, 
at 15. 
 92. See Duggin & Goldman, supra note 12, at 261 (“The shenanigans of senior 
executives in combination with the oversight failures of directors generated a crisis in 
corporate trust.”); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Reclaiming an Ethic of Corporate Responsibility, 
70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 957, 965-66 (2002) (discussing ways through which an ethic of 
corporate responsibility may be reinstated); see also Lyman Johnson, After Enron: 
Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 72 (2004) 
(arguing that “a moral vocabulary has been, and should remain, central to corporate law 
discourse”). 
 93. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 393 (3rd ed. 2005); 
William Gummow, Conclusion, in EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW 515, 518 (James Edelman 
& Simone Degeling eds., 2005); Lionel Smith, Fusion and Tradition, in EQUITY IN 
COMMERCIAL LAW, supra, at 19, 30. 
 94. See, e.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933) (finding that executive pay could 
become excessive and amount to waste and constitute a breach of fiduciary duties); see also 
Markham, supra note 60, at 281-83 (detailing cases involving American Tobacco Company, 
Bethlehem Steel, and National City Bank). 
 95. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive 
Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 571 (2001) (examining 124 cases 
where shareholders have brought claims of excessive compensation and concluding that 
shareholders are more likely to find success against smaller corporations when litigating 
outside of Delaware). 
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The effectiveness of fiduciary duty litigation over CEO compensation 
schemes was spotlighted recently in Delaware.  In the seminal case of In re 
Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, the Supreme Court of 
Delaware affirmed the Chancery Court’s recognition of a new duty of good 
faith in executive pay practices.96  The Delaware Court of Chancery had 
declared that, in addition to the traditional duties of care and loyalty, 
directors must have honesty of purpose and “a true faithfulness and 
devotion to the interests of the corporation and its shareholders.”97
The creation of this fiduciary principle of good faith arose in the 
decade-long shareholder derivative litigation over the hiring and firing of 
Michael Ovitz by his long-time friend and Disney CEO, Michael Eisner.
 
98  
Shareholders sought to recover against the directors after they paid Ovitz 
some $130 million in compensation (including a termination payout) for 
his abysmal one-year performance.99  Despite advising corporate counsel 
and the compensation committee to hire experts and follow best practices, 
the chancellor ultimately determined that no breach of duties had occurred 
by the Disney directors under the circumstances, and the Delaware 
Supreme Court affirmed that decision.100
The case has sparked a firestorm of controversy over the already 
burning question of CEO compensation.
 
101
 
 96. 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).  The shareholder 
derivative litigation involving The Walt Disney Company produced six court opinions.  See 
Duggin & Goldman, supra note 12, at 215 n.14 (recounting the decisions and their 
holdings). 
  It has been lauded for creating 
 97. Id. at 755, aff'd, 906 A.2d at 67.  For a pre-Disney discussion of Delaware’s 
emerging good faith duty, see Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 
456 (2004); see also E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in 
Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004?  A Retrospective on Some Key 
Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399 (2005) (recounting developments in Delaware’s 
corporate law, including the duty of good faith, by former Delaware Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Veasey during his tenure on the court). 
 98. Disney, 906 A.2d at 35-46. 
 99. Id. at 35. 
 100. Id.; Disney, 907 A.2d at 760 n.487 (albeit describing Disney’s business practices as 
that of “an imperial CEO” operating with a “supine or passive board”).  For instance, the 
compensation committee used an expert consultant, compared Ovitz’s options to others it 
had approved for other executives, and knew the downside protection of $150 to $200 
million Ovitz was seeking before leaving his company.  Disney, 906 A.2d at 56-59; see also 
Martin, supra note 67, at 500-01 (comparing Disney and Van Gorkom and concluding that 
the Delaware Supreme Court was consistent in its rulings). 
 101. See generally Duggin & Goldman, supra note 12 (discussing the “new” duty of 
good faith); see also Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric 
in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 7-8 (2005) (“The duty of good faith 
emerged in an environment of sturm und drang in corporate governance, when a series of 
scandals—including frauds and failures at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia, celebrity 
insider trading, and corruption in the IPO market—drew American corporate governance 
into question and plunged previously settled questions into heated debate.”).  For a 
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the obligation of good faith in setting executive pay levels.102  But it has 
also renewed calls for all courts to increase the level of scrutiny of board 
decisions in an effort to encourage directors to negotiate more “defensible” 
packages with CEOs.103
As a defense in a contract suit against the company, unclean hands 
avoids the lenient review of board decisions under existing fiduciary duty 
law.  Moreover, whether the outcome in Disney denotes the diminishing 
utility of fiduciary duty litigation in compensation cases, the recognition of 
an obligation of good faith provides at least the potential for extra 
protection from abusive pay practices in the future.
 
104  Dismissals under the 
“clean hands” doctrine for excessive executive compensation support the 
board’s good faith duty to monitor and oversee officers by allowing them 
to deny payment without incurring contract liability on behalf of the 
company.105  It would encourage directors not to negotiate absurdly 
fantastic compensation schemes in the first place and sustain their refusal to 
pay contracted-for compensation under circumstances of executive 
malfeasance.106
Concomitantly, with the availability of the “clean hands” doctrine, the 
directors’ failure to invoke the defense under circumstances amounting to 
 
 
description of how Delaware became the “center of the corporate universe” authored by the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Delaware, see E. Norman Veasey, Musings from the 
Center of the Corporate Universe, 7 DEL. L. REV. 163, 166-67 (2004). 
 102. See generally Martin, supra note 67 (discussing the positive element of the Disney 
ruling establishing the duty of good faith). 
 103. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 95, at 599-600 (discussing standards of review in 
executive compensation cases); see also Martin, supra note 67, at 537-38 (describing 
opportunities for stricter review in state courts); accord GRAEF CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF 
EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES (1991) (proposing that courts 
use an intermediate level of scrutiny in reviewing compensation packages); Linda J. Barris, 
The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 
IND. L.J. 59, 87 (1992) (discussing the standard of “reasonableness” in such cases); Detlev 
Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. 
L. 231, 252-61 (1983) (reviewing case law on executive compensation and review); Charles 
M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1867, 1897-99 (1992) (describing how a change in standards of review might influence 
corporate action). 
 104. Contra Markham, supra note 60, at 284 (claiming that courts are institutionally 
unable to deal with the issue of excessive compensation paid to executives). 
 105. See, e.g., Press Release, Watson Wyatt Worldwide, Corporate Directors Give 
Executive Pay Models Mixed Reviews (June 20, 2006), available at  
http://www.watsonwyatt.com/news/press.asp?ID=16180 (finding in a worldwide survey that 
61% of directors think that executives are overpaid). 
 106. See Jones v. Harris Assoc. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., 
dissenting) (noting the “feeble incentives of boards of directors to police compensation” 
(citing, e.g., Ivan E. Brick et al., CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and Firm 
Performance: Evidence of Cronyism?, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 403 (2006))), cert. granted, 129 
S.Ct. 1579, 173 L.Ed.2d 675 (Mar 09, 2009) (No. 08-586). 
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excess pay may be a violation of their fiduciary duty.  The extra threat of 
liability should incentivize them to act in the best interests of the 
company.107  Shareholder activism and even public indignation, also 
proving an effective deterrent against executive excesses in the pay setting 
process, should additionally motivate directorial diligence in seeking refuge 
from contract overreaching with unclean hands.108
Used in this way, the doctrine of “clean hands” provides an extra line 
of defense against avaricious executives and incentivizes directors to do the 
right thing regarding the negotiation and execution of officer pay packages.  
While neither the market nor the law alone has been effective in keeping 
directors faithful to their fiduciary responsibilities,
 
109
IV. EVOLUTION OF EQUITY 
 the defense of 
unclean hands provides an additional weapon in the corporate arsenal to 
combat executive greed and its toxic consequences to company 
stakeholders. 
Along with advancing the common goal of management 
accountability found in state corporation law and federal legislation, 
defeating excessive compensation by applying the “clean hands” doctrine 
preserves the traditional purpose and use of the defense.  Court utilization 
of unclean hands also curtails unethical business practices in contract cases 
and continues the modern doctrinal trend in extending the defense to 
damages actions.  It additionally reinforces the time-honored role of equity 
in maintaining the integrity of the law. 
 
 
 107. A strengthening of existing fiduciary law (through higher level scrutiny or 
otherwise) would be beneficial to encourage directors with respect to contract compensation 
decisions.  See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for 
Corporate Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1382 (2007) (advocating court use 
of prediction markets in fiduciary duty litigation to assess board decisions over how much to 
pay the CEO). 
 108. See Ertimur et al., supra note 42, at 27-30 (explaining how shareholder activism can 
act as a catalyst for change by inspiring other investors, the press, and even independent 
directors who have been targeted in vote-no campaigns); discussion supra notes 43-45 and 
accompanying text (discussing rates of implementation of shareholder proposals and 
reduction in CEO pay); see also John E. Core et al., The Power of the Pen and Executive 
Compensation, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 1-25 (2008) (studying the determinants and effect of 
negative compensation-related press coverage).  For additional evidence of board 
responsiveness to shareholder activism, see infra Part VI.B. 
 109. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral 
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1747-53 (2001) (suggesting trust 
is a more important factor in business decisions than fear of legal or market sanctions). 
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A. Role of Ancient Equity in Commercial Cases 
It must be emphasized that it was through courts not legislatures that 
society originally received protection from scandalous commercial 
practices.  For example, when the common law courts failed to stop 
defendants from being made to pay twice on the collection of a note under 
seal, equity was there.110  When the common law judges turned a blind eye 
to mistakes in the formation of contracts or in the unfairness of their 
execution, equity again intervened.111  Over time, these equitable principles 
became so well-regarded that the common law courts adopted them as their 
own.112
 
 110. See 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 20, 27 n.16 (5th ed. 
1941) (describing how the debtor would be required to pay multiple times on the same debt 
due to the absence of the defense of accord and satisfaction under the rigid common law); 
RALPH A. NEWMAN, EQUITY AND LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 26 (1961) (“If one paid a 
debt expressed in a sealed instrument without obtaining an acquittance, he could be made to 
pay again.”). 
  To be sure, the absorption of equity has been extensive enough that 
lawyers and lay persons alike consider “equity” to be a synonym for 
 111. The following areas were also in need of equitable protection from the strict 
common law: 
A person who injured another in self-defense must pay damages for the battery; 
he was also guilty of a crime. Killing by accident was a crime. 
Misrepresentation was not protected against by existing forms of action.  A 
wife’s property belonged to her husband during coverture. . . . Only contracts in 
the form of covenants under seal were enforced, and even in such cases the 
common law courts gave relief only if the breach involved an affirmative act.  
The theory of dependent promises was as yet undreamed of, and recovery for 
unjust enrichment was four centuries away. 
T. Leigh Anenson, The Triumph of Equity: Equitable Estoppel in Modern Litigation, 27 
REV. LITIG. 377, 380 n.5 (2008) (quoting NEWMAN, supra note 110, at 25–26); see also 
ROBERT MEGARRY & P.V. BAKER, SNELL’S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 12 (27th ed. 1973) (“A 
plaintiff who had obtained a judgment in his favour in a court of law might be prevented 
from enforcing it by a ‘common injunction’ granted by the Court of Chancery, because in 
the opinion of the latter court he had obtained the judgment unfairly.”); Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Early English Equity, 1 L.Q. REV. 162, 162-63 (1885) (discussing substantive 
doctrines developed in chancery). 
 112. Evidence of these equitable principles can be seen in Spect v. Spect: 
The distinction between strict law and equity is never in any country a 
permanent distinction. Law and equity are in continual progression, and the 
former is constantly gaining ground upon the latter. A great part of what is now 
strict law was formerly considered as equity, and the equitable decisions of this 
age will unavoidably be ranked under the strict law of the next (internal citation 
omitted). 
26 P. 203, 205 (Cal. 1891) (quoting Lord Redesdale explaining the equitable penetration of 
the common law); Robert S. Stevens, A Plea for the Extension of Equitable Principles and 
Remedies, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 351, 354 (1956) (discussing the law’s adoption of equitable 
principles); see also discussion infra notes 125-31 and accompanying text (discussing 
common law absorption of many equitable defenses in contract law). 
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fairness.113  Simply put, “[i]t is a question of ethics.”114
It is true that since the rise of the regulatory state during the early 
twentieth century, protection from fraud and other nefarious commercial 
practices has fallen within the domain of legislation.  But public protection 
from unethical conduct did not begin with the financial fraud and dubious 
ethical practices that ushered in the Great Depression and inspired the 
Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934.
 
115
 
 113. See, e.g., Rauscher v. City of Lincoln, 691 N.W.2d 844, 852 (Neb. 2005) (“Equity 
is determined on a case-by-case basis when justice and fairness so require.”); Clark v. 
Teeven Holding Co., 625 A.2d 869, 878 (Del. Ch. 1992) (“The use of the term ‘equitable 
principles’ . . . is merely equivalent to the words ‘principles of fairness or justice.’”); Ohio 
St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Frantz, 555 N.E.2d 630, 633 (Ohio 1990) (indicating that justice is 
the objective of equity); see also MEGARRY & BAKER, supra note 111, at 6 (noting that, in 
modern English statutes, provisions relating to what is “equitable” are usually construed to 
mean what is “fair”); Donald Nichols & Chandra Subramaniam, Executive Compensation: 
Excessive or Equitable?, 29 J. BUS. ETHICS 339, 340 (2001) (equating equity with fairness in 
the context of CEO compensation); Roger Young & Stephen Spitz, SUEM—Spitz’s Ultimate 
Equitable Maxim: In Equity, Good Guys Should Win and Bad Guys Should Lose, 55 S.C. L. 
REV. 175, 178 (2003) (commenting that the basic orthodoxy of equity is that “[the] good 
guys should win and [the] bad guys should lose”).  Indeed, it was the perception that parallel 
court systems were applying similar substantive rules under different procedural processes 
that led to the idea of integration.  See William Searle Holdsworth, Blackstone’s Treatment 
of Equity, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1930) (reviewing the discussion between Lord Mansfield 
and Blackstone about the procedural and substantive differences in law and equity); Thomas 
O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 464 
(2003) (discussing the merger of the law and equity regimes and the importance of 
maintaining equitable principles). 
  Nor did it originate in the previous 
century with the enactment of the anti-trust laws to bust the powerful 
 114. Dezell v. Odell, 3 Hill 215, 225 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842); see also Zechariah Chafee, 
Jr., Foreword to SELECTED ESSAYS ON EQUITY 59 (Edward D. Re ed., 1955) (commenting 
that equity courts “mainly clothed moral values with legal sanctions”).  Every chancellor 
from 1380 to 1488 was a church official.  Thomas Edward Scrutton, Roman Law Influence 
in Chancery, Church Courts, Admiralty, and Law Merchant, in SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 208, 214–15 (Ass’n of Am. Law Schs. ed., 1907); see also 
Henry Arthur Hollond, Some Early Chancellors, 9 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 17, 23 (1945) 
(indicating that the position was held by laymen for only about twelve years during the 
fourteenth century).  As an ecclesiastic, the official was trained in Canon and moral law.  
Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REV. 
779, 780 (1945) (discussing the long line of bishops and archbishops serving as 
chancellors).  Non-clerical chancellors were drawn from the ranks of the common lawyers 
beginning in the sixteenth century.  MEGARRY & BAKER, supra note 111, at 9; see also 
Glenn & Redden, supra, at 779 (advising that Sir Thomas Moore was the first lawyer to be 
Lord Chancellor in 1529). 
 115. Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2002); Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2002).  See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 
388-89 (1983) (explaining that the purpose of the securities laws was “to rectify perceived 
deficiencies in the available common law protections by establishing higher standards of 
conduct in the securities industry”); Prentice, supra note 70, at 619, 623 (noting that the 
securities laws were meant to strengthen the common law and citing additional lower 
federal court cases). 
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railroad trusts.116
Rather, protection from unethical conduct began in England during the 
Middle Ages when chancellors and, eventually, equity courts applied moral 
principles to achieve justice during a time when the “‘might makes right’ 
mentality was once the conscience of kings and nobles.”
 
117  Since the rise 
of the modern corporation, corporate directors have become the new 
aristocracy and have crowned CEOs king.118
 
 116. See George F. Canfield, Is a Large Corporation an Illegal Combination or 
Monopoly under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act?, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 95, 108 (1909) (discussing 
the treatment of railroad companies under the anti-trust laws); Thomas S. Ulen, Cartels and 
Regulation: Late Nineteenth Century Railroad Collusion and the Creation of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, 40 J. ECON. HIST. 179 (1980) (same); see also FRIEDMAN, supra 
note 93, at 390 (citing the technological advances of the nineteenth century as first providing 
corporations—initially the railroads—a commanding position in the economy).  President 
Theodore Roosevelt pressed for greater corporate accountability and an even more 
expanded role for the federal government in the oversight of big business.  President 
Roosevelt Speaks on Trusts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1903, at 1; see, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of 
New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (finding that the defendant’s practices 
constituted a restraint of trade); United States v. American Tobacco Company, 221 U.S. 106 
(1911) (same). 
  It does not take too much 
imagination to recognize how medieval history bears an eerie resemblance 
to the present day events.  Moreover, given that the public power vacuum 
left by foreign governments is being filled by private multinational 
 117. Anenson, supra note 111, at 386 (quoting WILLIAM F. WALSH, A TREATISE ON 
EQUITY 99–100 (1930)); see also WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD III act 5, sc. 2 (“Every 
man’s conscience is a thousand men.”).  Legal and the ethical principles were not separate 
concepts during the formative stages of the common law legal system.  See George Burton 
Adams, The Origin of English Equity, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 87, 91 (1916), reprinted in 
SELECTED ESSAYS ON EQUITY 1, 5 (Edward D. Re ed., 1955) (“Common Law and Equity 
originated together as one undifferentiated system in the effort of the king to carry out his 
duty of furnishing security and justice . . . .”); William F. Walsh, Equity Prior to the 
Chancellor’s Court, 17 GEO. L.J. 97, 100–06 (1929) (finding the roots of equity 
administration beginning with nobility); see also H. D. Hazeltine, The Early History of 
English Equity, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL HISTORY: READ BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 
OF HISTORICAL STUDIES HELD IN LONDON IN 1913, at 261–85 (Paul Vinogradoff ed., 1913) 
(providing examples of equity-like ethical principles in the common law).  The High Court 
of Chancery emerged as a separate forum for the administration of equity around the 
fourteenth century.  NEWMAN, supra note 110, at 22–23; see also 1 JOHN LORD CAMPBELL, 
LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS 206 (1878) (noting that the court began as a marble table 
and chair at the upper end of Westminster Hall on the right hand side of the entryway, 
opposite to the King’s Bench on the left).  For details on the separation of law and equity 
court systems, see Anenson, supra note 111, at 378 n.4.  Countries of the civil law never 
developed distinct concepts of law and equity.  See Jerome Frank, Civil Law Influences on 
the Common Law-Some Reflections on Comparative and Contrastive Law, 104 U. PA. L. 
REV. 887, 895 (1956) (comparing the English and German systems of equity). 
 118. See, e.g., Herbert Hevenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal 
Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1641 (1988) (noting how directors, in contrast to shareholders, 
are the entities allowed to assert constitutional claims involving the corporation). 
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companies,119 there are even more reasons to consider an equitable 
response to unethical behavior.  As business entities have grown in size and 
sophistication, along with their insatiable interests and unethical 
stratagems, so too has equity.120
 
 119. See generally SARAH ANDERSON ET AL., FIELD GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
(2005) (placing Wal-Mart and General Motors in the top twenty-five overall in a 2002 
comparison of countries’ national gross domestic products with the sales of major 
corporations); SPECIAL REPORT: THE FORBES GLOBAL 2000 (2005), available at 
http://www.forbes.com/2005/03/30/05f2000land.html (noting the influx of international 
companies into non-domestic markets); WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007: 
DEVELOPMENT AND THE NEXT GENERATION 294 (Table 4, Economic Activity), available at 
http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/09/13/000112742_
20060913111024/Rendered/PDF/359990WDR0complete.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2010) 
(showing the economic activity of countries around the world); cf. DANIEL A. YERGIN & 
JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY 
(1998) (describing the imbalance of power between government and the growing private 
sector to the point that nation-states have lost the ability to influence the market, to deliver 
social goods, and to protect the environment); DAN BRIODY, THE HALLIBURTON AGENDA: 
THE POLITICS OF OIL AND MONEY (2004) (commenting on the influence of private military 
companies and their parents on foreign policy direction in some nation-states); RAYMOND 
BAKER, CAPITALISM’S ACHILLES HEEL: DIRTY MONEY AND HOW TO RENEW THE FREE 
MARKET SYSTEM (2005) (arguing that MNCs profit maximization objective has exploited 
tax laws of different nation-states and deprived them of adequate pubic resources to regulate 
the market or provide essential public goods); JURGEN HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL 
CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL ESSAYS (2001) (discussing national governments’ deregulation 
agendas leading to obscene profits and drastic income disparities due to the fear of capital 
flight). 
  Indeed, it was the flexibility and 
 120. See Burbank, supra note 81, at 1296 (commenting that our legal culture is 
accustomed to claims for the “‘triumph of equity’ and to thinking about equity as an engine 
of legal development”); Sidney Post Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50 HARV. L. 
REV. 171, 179-81 (1937) (predicting that the future of equity is good and certain because it 
is a flexible tradition for allowing growth in the law).  For the popularity of the doctrine of 
“clean hands” in particular, see CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY, supra note 34, at 12 
(noting the “astonishing number” of cases decided under the doctrine of unclean hands); 
Anenson, Post-Merger Justification of Unclean Hands, supra note 29, at 459 (“Despite its 
containment to mainly actions in equity, cases considering the doctrine during the present 
century already tally in the thousands.”).  
Over the last decade, more than one-half of Americans owned stock in corporations, 
in comparison with only one percent owning stock in 1900 and thirteen percent owning 
stock in 1980.  See THEODORE CAPLOW ET AL., THE FIRST MEASURED CENTURY: AN 
ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO TRENDS IN AMERICA, 1900–2000 Ch. 14 (2001), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/fmc/book/14business6.htm (discussing the amount of stock-holders 
based on the percentage of the population); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2006 455 (125th ed. 2005), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/06statab/income.pdf (providing 1998 
data indicating that approximately fifty-two percent of Americans own stock in corporations 
through individual investment, mutual funds, and pension plans).  Large corporations also 
employ tens of millions of workers.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra, at 382 (follow “Table 
Number 655” link) (detailing the composition of individuals” savings).  See generally 
Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business 
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discretionary nature of equity that allowed courts to incorporate ethical 
standards of business into the law in a way that reflected prevailing social 
norms.121
B. Integration of Equity in Modern Contract Law 
 
The success of the early equity courts and their principles should not 
to be forgotten.122  Today, many (if not most) of the theories of modern 
contract law are derived from ancient equity.123  Defenses like fraud, 
duress, illegality, unconscionability, and accommodation originated in 
equity.124  Other equitable defenses like estoppel,125 waiver,126 rescission,127
 
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 387, 390-92 (2003) (explaining 
how the corporate structure provided an ideal legal framework for amassing the vast sums 
necessary to develop capital and to facilitate business and financial objectives). 
 
 121. See NEWMAN, supra note 110, at 12-22; id. at 255 (“The evolution of law is to a 
large extent the history of its absorption of equity.”); see also Mike Macnair, Equity and 
Conscience, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 659, 664 (2007) (noting the prevailing view of the 
Chancery as providing a regime to deal with the defects of the late medieval common law, 
which failed to adapt to new developments in society and the economy). 
 122. See, e.g., Keith Mason, Fusion: Fallacy, Future or Finished?, in EQUITY IN 
COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 93, at 74 (commenting that “the Court of Chancery flowered 
‘to soften and mollify the Extremity of the Law.’” (quoting Lord Ellesmere in his claim for 
equity’s supremacy over Lord Coke’s common law before James I)); Douglas Laycock, The 
Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 67-68 (1993) (explaining that common 
law without equity would have been a functioning system, but in many applications it would 
have been “barbarous, unjust, absurd” (quoting 1 FREDERICK W. MAITLAND, EQUITY 1, 19 
(2d ed. 1936))). 
 123. See generally LARRY A. DIMATTEO, EQUITABLE LAW OF CONTRACTS: STANDARDS 
AND PRINCIPLES 30 (2001) (explaining that the foundational principles of equity (fair play, 
protection of weaker parties, equality of consideration) influenced the development of 
contract law in the eighteenth century).  It has also been argued that equitable principles 
have been incorporated again into contract law during the twentieth century.  See W. DAVID 
SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE-20TH CENTURY EQUITABLE REFORMATION OF 
CONTRACT LAW (1996) (asserting that beginning in the 1960s courts ended the remains of 
unfettered freedom of contract and replaced it with the reasonable expectations approach 
and fairness rationales in contract enforcement); See also Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity’s 
Modification of Contract: An Analysis of the Twentieth Century’s Equitable Reformation of 
Contract Law, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 265 (1999) (maintaining that equitable consideration of 
fair exchange has increasingly been used as a counterweight to freedom of contract). 
 124. See James B. Ames, Specialty Contracts and Equitable Defenses, 9 HARV. L. REV. 
49 (1896) (discussing how the former equitable defenses of fraud, illegality, failure of 
consideration, payment, accommodation, and duress were subsequently recognized at law in 
specialty contracts).  For a discussion of the contribution of equity to the law of fraud, see 3 
JOHN N. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: AS ADMINISTERED IN THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §§ 872-974a (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941) and 
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 907 (1985) (citing fraud as another 
example of equitable affirmative relief to a legal claim).  For unconscionability, see Leasing 
Service Corp. v. Justice, 673 F.2d 70, 71 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Originating in Equity as a form of 
relief against the harshness of penal bonds, [unconscionability] has been employed by courts 
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ratification,128 and acquiescence129 share a similar evolution.  Unclean 
hands also originated as a defense in contract cases.130  But due to its 
different procedural posture, it remained relegated to cases seeking 
equitable relief for most of its two hundred year history.131
 
to deny enforcement to harsh and unreasonable contract terms.”).  Unconscionability has 
also been made available at law or in equity as demonstrated by U.C.C. § 2-302 (1990) and 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208. 
  Since the 
 125. See, e.g., Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U.S. 68 (1880) (adopting equitable estoppel into the 
common law); see also William F. Walsh, Is Equity Decadent?, 22 MINN. L. REV. 479, 485 
(1938) (explaining that equitable estoppel was “fully adopted” in courts of law by 1938).  
Equitable estoppel is comprised of three elements that courts must consider in accepting or 
denying the use of the doctrine in a particular case.  T. Leigh Anenson, From Theory to 
Practice: Analyzing Equitable Estoppel Under a Pluralistic Model of Law, 11 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 633, 640 (2007).  There are also various kinds of estoppel defenses besides 
equitable estoppel.  For judicial estoppel, see Walter S. Beck, Estoppel Against Inconsistent 
Position In Judicial Proceedings, 9 BROOK. L. REV. 245, 250-55 (1940).  For collateral 
estoppel, see Jay Carlisle, Getting a Full Bite of the Apple: When Should the Doctrine of 
Issue Preclusion Make An Administrative or Arbitral Determination Binding in a Court of 
Law?, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 63, 84-88 (1986).  For quasi-estoppel, see Simmons v. 
Burlington, Cedar Raids & Northern Railway, 159 U.S. 278, 291 (1895). 
 126. See, e.g., USH Ventures v. Global Telesystems Group, Inc., 796 A.2d 7, 19 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 2000) (“Waiver has been, for some time, used at law as a valid defense to 
contract suits.”); cf. LAYCOCK, supra note 125, at 907 (“I have never been able to find out 
whether waiver originated at law or equity, but it no longer matters.”). 
 127. 12A C.J.S. Cancellation of Instruments § 4 (1980); see also USH Ventures, 796 
A.2d at 18 (noting that rescission is both a cause of action and a defense). 
 128. USH Ventures, 796 A.2d at 18-20; Colish v. Brandywine Raceway Ass’n, 119 A.2d 
887, 892 (Del. Super. Ct. 1955).  For a discussion on the ratification defense, see 1 JOHN N. 
POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: AS ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA § 69 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941). 
 129. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 44 (Hornbook Series, 2d ed. 1993) 
(discussing the invocation of acquiescence in purely legal cases). 
 130. Chafee I, supra note 34, at 878.  The clean hands doctrine was first recognized as a 
legal precedent in England in 1787.  Dering v. Earl of Winchelsea, 1 Cox Eq. 318, 29 Eng. 
Rep. 1185 (1787); see also Chafee I, supra note 34, at 881-82 (tracing the clean hands 
doctrine’s origins in various treatises).  The United States Supreme Court followed in 1795.  
Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. 133 (1795); see also Cathcart v. Robinson, 30 U.S. 264 (1831) 
(recognizing that the defense was “well settled”); CHAFEE, supra note 34, at 5 (“[Unclean 
hands] is exactly as old as the United States Constitution.”).  The first state to recognize 
unclean hands was New Jersey in 1793.  Mason v. Evans, 1793 WL 453, at *4 (N.J. 1793).  
But see Chafee I, supra note 34, at 884 (“The earliest judicial use of the phrase ‘clean 
hands’ on this side of the Atlantic, as far as I know, was in Ohio in 1826.” (citing Mattox v. 
Mattox, 2 Ohio 233, 233-34 (1826))).  The idea of clean hands has been recognized for 
nearly two thousand years in the civil law.  NEWMAN, supra note 110, at 250 n.19 
(explaining the clean hands doctrine’s application in Chinese customary law in the tenth and 
eleventh centuries); Anenson, Post-Merger Justification of Unclean Hands, supra note 29, 
at 478 (noting the doctrine’s persistence in civil legal systems stemming from its use in 
ancient Rome in the second century). 
 131. Anenson, Post-Merger Justification of Unclean Hands, supra note 29, at 465-66; 
see also Anenson, Process-Based Theory of Unclean Hands, supra note 29 (“Perhaps due to 
its newness relative to the other doctrines, the defense remained exclusively a defense 
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merger of law and equity courts and their procedures,132 however, courts 
have begun to fuse unclean hands into cases where legal relief, like 
damages, is sought.133
 
against equitable (not legal) actions at the time of the merger.”).  When courts administered 
law and equity in separate judicial systems before the merger, litigants pled unclean hands 
exclusively as a defense to an action for equitable affirmative relief in the court of chancery.  
DOBBS, supra note 130, §2.4(1) at 66-67; Anenson, Process-Based Theory of Unclean 
Hands, supra note 29.  It was an equitable defense to equitable claims but not a defense to 
legal claims.  See Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, 
Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 281 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Unclean hands is a traditional defense to an action 
for equitable relief.”); see also E.W. Hinton, Equitable Defenses under Modern Codes, 18 
MICH. L. REV. 717, 719 (1920) (“[T]here were equitable defenses to equitable claims, where 
there were no similar defense to corresponding legal claims.”); cf. John L. Garvey, Some 
Aspects of the Merger of Law and Equity, 10 CATH. U. L. REV. 59, 66-67 (1961) (noting that 
laches shared the same procedural posture as unclean hands); Aalberts & Anenson, supra 
note 81 (discussing the use of the equitable defense of laches). 
 
For a discussion on the general operation of the two systems, see FREDERICK WILLIAM 
MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 17 (Chayton ed. 1909); Willard Barbour, 
Some Aspects of Fifteenth Century Chancery, 31 HARV. L. REV. 834, 834 (1918); William 
Searle Holdsworth, The Relation of the Equity Administered by the Common Law Judges to 
the Equity Administered by the Chancellor, 26 YALE L. REV. 1, 15 (1916). 
 132. While some early American courts were modeled upon the dual English system 
with separate law and equity courts, WILLIAM F. WALSH, OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW 69-70 (1923), some state courts as well as the federal court 
system administered law and equity in the same court with different procedures.  Charles T. 
McCormick, The Fusion of Law and Equity, 6 N.C. L. REV. 283, 284 (1928); Robert von 
Moschzisker, Equity Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 287 (1927). 
In the state court system, separate law and equity procedures began to be unified with 
the 1848 Field Code in New York.  Mildred Coe & Lewis Morse, Chronology of the 
Development of the David Dudley Field Code, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 238 (1942); Stephen N. 
Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: An Historical Analysis of an Earlier 
Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311 (1988); see also CHARLES E. CLARK, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 19-20 (1928) (noting the Field Code’s influence 
on the procedural reform in other states and territories).  In the federal court system, the 
unification occurred in 1938 when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went into effect.  
See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered the Common Law: The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 929-39 (1987) 
(discussing the historical use and development of equity in the federal court system); see 
also NEWMAN, supra note 110, at 51 (explaining that the federal reform resulted in 
“essentially the same reforms” as the states); cf. Lord Chancellor & Mr. Justice Lurton, The 
Operation of the Reformed Equity Procedure in England, 26 HARV. L. REV. 99, 100-01 
(1912) (discussing the simultaneous reform effort underway in England culminating in the 
abolishment of the Court of Chancery and the enactment of the English Judicature Acts of 
1873 and 1875); Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law 
World, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 435, 486-88 (2000) (discussing an 1828 speech by Lord 
Brougham as the catalyst for procedural change).  A handful of states, including Delaware, 
have retained separate court systems and/or procedures.  See Anenson, Post-Merger 
Justification of Unclean Hands, supra note 29, at 457 n.5 (listing states that have maintained 
separate systems). 
 133. While the legal status of unclean hands remains an open question in most 
jurisdictions, there are hundreds of cases now applying the defense against legal remedies.  
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The issue of the fusion of law and equity has stimulated a world-wide 
discussion.134  In the United States, a series of articles has attempted to 
clarify the conflict and confusion in the cases and justify the incorporation 
of unclean hands into the law on doctrinal and normative grounds.135  This 
research explained that the law-equity merger in federal and state civil 
procedure allows courts to adopt the defense in lawsuits seeking legal 
remedies on a case-by-case basis.136  The research further directs courts to 
be sensitive to whether the application of the defense is consistent with its 
purposes and does not otherwise defeat the purposes of the asserted 
claim.137
 
Anenson, Limiting Legal Remedies, supra note 29 (detailing cases demonstrating the 
application of the defense against legal remedies).  The Supreme Court of Michigan and 
lower courts in California, Maryland, New York, Connecticut, and Rhode Island have begun 
the process of adopting the equitable defense of unclean hands.  Id.  Federal courts from the 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have also recognized the 
doctrine’s availability under federal law in actions seeking legal relief.  Id.; see also 
Anenson, Post-Merger Justification of Unclean Hands, supra note 29 (summarizing such 
cases).  But see Anenson, Process-based Theory of Unclean Hands, supra note 29, at 7 n.21 
(noting five state supreme courts and lower courts that have rejected the defense of unclean 
hands in damages actions). 
  Therefore, the evolution of equity in general, and unclean hands 
 134. See BEVERLEY MCLACHLIN, INTRODUCTION TO EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW, supra 
note 93, at vii (Chief Justice, Canadian Supreme Court) (“[D]espite the passage of time, the 
fusion of law and equity remains a live issue today, subject to debate by academics, 
practitioners, and judges alike.”); Tion Min Yeo, Choice of Law for Equity, in EQUITY IN 
COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 93, at 147, 150 (“The extent of the fusion of the substantive 
rules of common law and equity remains a matter of great controversy today, and different 
legal systems in the common law tradition have adopted different approaches to this 
question.”); see also MCLACHLIN, supra (calling the law-equity debate the “fusion wars”). 
 135. See, e.g., Anenson, Post-Merger Justification of Unclean Hands, supra note 29, at 
477-508 (arguing that the division of law and equity for the defense of unclean hands 
answers the wrong question, lacks a rational basis, produces anomalous results, and invites 
other irregularities in the administration of justice); accord Douglas Laycock, THE DEATH OF 
THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE (1991) (making this point persuasively in other aspects of 
equity jurisprudence, like remedies); Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury 
Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687 (1990) (same); see also sources cited supra note 29; cf. Walter 
Wheeler Cook, Equitable Defenses, 32 YALE L.J. 645, 657 (1923) (reviewing case 
confusion concerning the pleading of equitable defenses after merger, and concluding that 
clear legal analysis is “absolutely essential if we are ever to blend common law and equity 
law into a single, harmonious, and self-consistent system”). 
 136. See Anenson, Post-Merger Justification of Unclean Hands, supra note 29, at 474-
76; accord Anthony Mason, Fusion, in EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 93, at 12 
(discussing merger in England and Australia, and noting:  “it is also clear that the 
[Judicature] Acts did not require the courts to treat the rules of common law and equity as if 
they must forever remain unchanged in frozen isolation”); Mason, Fusion: Fallacy, Future 
or Finished?, in EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 93, at 56 (“[I]t [is] equally clear 
that the Judicature Act did not forbid the continuing development of law and equity, 
including development in the direction of integration of principles, if the single Court 
otherwise considered this an appropriate application of earlier precedents.”). 
 137. See, e.g., Anenson, Limiting Legal Remedies, supra note 29 (“Rather than 
continuing to deny the defense in legal actions in reliance on its historical pedigree, the 
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in particular, provide a foundation for an equitable resolution to the issue of 
excessive executive compensation. 
V. PUBLIC POLICY 
Policy-based analysis supports the consideration of unclean hands 
where a CEO’s excessive compensation is at issue.  Specifically, fairness to 
the parties and to the public outweigh freedom of contract concerns.  The 
emphasis on ethics and fair play in business relations, furthermore, is 
equivalent to the definition of the defense.138
A. Just Price and the Public Interest 
  Modern ethics scholarship 
imposes moral duties on both directors and the CEO and supports the 
consideration of a CEO’s “clean hands.”  Lastly, the use of the clean hands 
defense is unlikely to raise pay and, even so, will cure compensation that is 
excessively inflated in individual cases. 
 As an initial matter, concerns for freedom of contract have always 
been subject to equitable correction.139
 
trend of absorbing the equitable defense of unclean hands into the law is likely to continue 
on the basis of policy.”).  Zechariah Chafee, Jr., a practitioner and professor at Harvard Law 
School, was the first scholar to thoroughly analyze unclean hands in the United States.  The 
Thomas M. Cooley Lectures that he delivered at the University of Michigan Law School in 
1949 and his subsequent publications in the Michigan Law Review continue to be the 
primary source of the American experience with the equitable defense.  Chafee I, supra note 
34; Chafee II, supra note 34; Anenson, Post-Merger Justification of Unclean Hands, supra 
note 29.  Chafee examined a total of eighteen different groups of cases considering unclean 
hands and concluded that each case should be decided within the orbit of the transaction and 
the surrounding facts.  See Chafee I, supra note 34, at 887 (“[D]ecisions have been shaped 
by the special requirements and the subjects and not merely ethics.”); id. at 892 (advising of 
the great advantage of inducing a more critical exam of the various policies, ethical or 
otherwise, which ought to govern the case). 
  In medieval times, “just price” 
 138. See Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244-45 (1933) 
(“[T]hat whenever a party who, as actor, seeks to set the judicial machinery in motion and 
obtain some remedy, has violated conscience, or good faith, or other equitable principle, in 
his prior conduct, then the doors of the court will be shut against him in limine; the court 
will refuse to interfere on his behalf, to acknowledge his right, or to award him any 
remedy.”); CHAFEE, supra note 34, at 1 (declaring that the maxim of unclean hands “derives 
from the unwillingness of a court of equity, as a court of conscience, to lend the aid of its 
extraordinary powers to a plaintiff who himself is guilty of reprehensible conduct in the 
controversy and thereby to endorse such behavior”); see, e.g., supra notes 33-36 and 
accompanying text. 
 139. Judge Cardozo’s now classic opinion in Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 
889, 891 (N.Y. 1921) stated that “equity and fairness” outweighed “consistency and 
certainty.”  WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 166 (2002) (reviewing the 
case); see also Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract: The Fairness Inquiry and the 
“Law of Satisfaction”—A Nonunified Theory, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 443 (1995) (citing 
the case as an example of the ongoing tug of war in contract law between the norms of 
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theory moderated the certainty of contract relationships concerning 
principles of fairness and morality.140  The modern moral equivalent is the 
doctrine of unconscionability where excessive price is one determinant of 
the defense.141  With employment agreements in particular, equitable 
considerations have given rise to a social contract theory where courts look 
to norms outside the four corners of the agreement.142
 
certainty and predictability and the norms of fairness and justice). 
 
 140. DIMATTEO, supra note 123, at 3-28 (depicting how Thomas Aquinas resurrected the 
Aristotelian theory of justice as a philosophical foundation for the medieval doctrine of just 
price).  A sale in excess of the just price was considered immoral and subject to judicial 
scrutiny.  Id. at 3.  It was a multifaceted concept that acted as “a legal device, a moral 
imperative, and an economic doctrine.”  John W. Baldwin, The Medieval Theories of Just 
Price: Romanists, Canonists, and Theologians in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, in 
49 TRANSACTIONS AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 8 (1959); see also DIMATTEO, supra note 123, at 11 
(placing just price theory within the broader context of the ecclesiastical origins of equity 
whose purpose was to protect those with a lower economic status and to enforce relations of 
trust and confidence) (citations omitted). 
 141. See DIMATTEO, supra note 123, at 13 (“Much of the Aristotelian logic embedded in 
the notion of corrective justice that supported just price theory also underpins modern day 
contract doctrine.”); id. at 5 (“[R]emnants of just price theory still reverberate in the 
substantive fairness doctrines of the twentieth century.”).  For cases discussing the origins of 
unconscionability, see supra note 116 and accompanying text.  Another contemporary 
contract defense that looks to the equality of the bargain is economic duress.  See 
DIMATTEO, supra note 123, at 13.  Grave failures in the equivalence of value in the 
exchange between the parties may also vitiate the basic assumption of the contract.  See 
ALCOA v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 91 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (applying concepts of 
equivalence and basic assumption to the doctrines of impracticability, frustration of purpose, 
and mistake); see also W.F. Young, Half Measures, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 19, 31 (1981) 
(analyzing half measure remedies for mistakes to determine how courts cure false basic 
assumptions about the contract); cf. Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Rich, A Consent Theory of 
Unconscionability:  An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 1067 (2006) 
(arguing that despite the unconscionability doctrine’s grounding in substantive unfairness, 
consent-based factors are more predictive of a court’s decision to use the doctrine). 
 142. See T. Leigh Anenson & Karen Eilers Lahey, The Crisis in Corporate America: 
Private Pension Liability and Proposals for Reform, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 495 (2007) 
(describing the companion concepts of relational contract and psychological contract 
theory).  Relational contract doctrine arose as a tool for understanding commercial contracts.  
See, e.g., David Campbell, Ian Macneil and the Relational Theory of Contract, in IAN 
MACNEIL, THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL 3 
(David Campbell ed., 2001) (describing historical development of relational contract 
theory).  Psychological contract theory began in the management literature as a method for 
managing business relations.  See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: 
Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 
519, 549-53 (2001) (noting the expansion in application for psychological contract theory 
from management employees to lower level employees, in addition to other areas of 
employment law).  Scholars have been pushing for recognition of these broader norms in all 
areas of employment law.  See Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. 
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149, 166 (2005) (explaining the history and development of 
psychological contract theory and its growing popularity among employment law scholars); 
cf. THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A SOCIAL CONTRACTS 
APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999) (allowing 
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Recall too that contract law conceived the doctrine of unclean 
hands.143  Importantly, courts (including the U.S. Supreme Court) have 
justified its application in business cases that are of great public interest.144  
In the context of executive compensation, the use of unclean hands furthers 
the broad public interest of reposing confidence in the pay process as well 
as the judgment of the board.145  It also prevents the corresponding 
consequences of such pay abuses to the company and its many 
stakeholders.146
B. Ethics and Excessive Compensation 
  Hence, it is private law that supports public policy. 
In addition, the foundation of the “clean hands” doctrine is ethical 
behavior.147
 
values, practices, policies to emerge locally, creating thick micro-social norms that have 
community support as emanations of deliberative democracy on a local scale). 
  Since the astronomical rise in CEO paychecks and its 
 143. See discussion supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 144. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942) (a court of 
equity “may appropriately withhold their aid where the plaintiff is using the right asserted 
contrary to the public interest”); Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maint. Mach. 
Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945) (invoking unclean hands in part due to the public interest); 
accord Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 273 (2d. Cir. 2005) 
(extending equitable defense of laches to legal cases based on protection of third parties); cf. 
Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrine, 27 HARV. L. 
REV. 195, 226–27 (1914) (placing law in its historical context and comparing equity stage 
that prevented the individualistic, unconscientious exercise of rights to early twentieth-
century socialization of law stage that prevented anti-social exercise of rights). 
 145. See Vagts, supra note 103, at 276 (“If the courts act, even occasionally, to trim 
compensation it will, in turn, be easier for compensation committees to tell executives that 
they simply cannot gratify their pocket-books and egos as much as the executives 
demand.”); cf. SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 117 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that the 
primary purpose of the disgorgement remedy against executives under the federal securities 
laws is to “prevent wrongdoers from unjustly enriching themselves through violations, 
which has the effect of deterring subsequent fraud . . . . The emphasis on public protection, 
as opposed to simple compensatory relief, illustrates the equitable nature of the remedy”); 
Schwartz, supra note 55, at 22-25 (discussing the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine 
that imposes strict civil and criminal liability on CEOs whose companies violated statutes 
dealing with public health, safety, and welfare, in situations where members of the public 
cannot easily protect themselves). 
 146. See Martin, supra note 67, at 538 (noting that mere warnings from judges will not 
“encourage directors to undertake serious, arms-length negotiations with CEOs and to reject 
excessive packages”); see also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d 
Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1105 (1971) (“[A] corporate 
enterprise may well suffer harm when officers and directors abuse their position to obtain 
personal profits since the effect may be to cast a cloud on the corporation’s name, injure 
stockholder relations and undermine public regard for the corporation’s securities.”); see 
also discussions in supra notes 5, 15. 
 147. See Chafee I, supra note 34, at 886 (reviewing cases where the defense was raised 
in suits for specific performance of contracts where the applicant has engaged in fraud, 
sharp practice, or other unethical conduct); see also supra notes 32-33 and accompanying 
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repercussions,148 scholars in applied philosophy and business have been 
weighing in on the relationship between ethics and excessive 
compensation.149
A leading strain of criticism for excessive compensation is the 
frequent disutility of CEO overcompensation, both to the corporation’s 
long-term prospects and the short-term effects on shareholders.
  All agree that executives and board members have ethical 
duties to the company with respect to hiring and compensation. 
150  Various 
scholars of philosophy and management have emphasized that excessive 
compensation packages detract from other functions of the corporation 
(such as research and development),151 from the morale of mid-level 
managers,152 and, most significantly, from shareholder earnings.153  
Moreover, regardless of utility, critics of extraordinarily large 
compensation for CEOs believe that such compensation violates a basic 
sense of fairness or justice, or what ethicists call distributive justice.154
Furthermore, virtue ethics supports an ethical duty of the CEO and the 
board not to negotiate, accept, and/or award unreasonable compensation.  
In writing about executive compensation, virtue ethicists remind readers 
that reducing human motives to strictly economic ones may very well miss 
the heart of why people are called to a particular life in business.
 
155
 
text. 
  
 148. See discussion supra note 15. 
 149. See, e.g., Francis T Hannafey, Economic and Moral Criteria of Executive 
Compensation, 108 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 405, 406 (2003) (proposing moral and economic 
criteria in a preliminary effort to provide a framework for compensation decision-making); 
see also supra notes 21-23. 
 150. See, e.g., Moriarty, supra note 15; see also Nichols & Subramanian, supra note 113, 
at 339 (noting that the utility of very large compensation packages is highly debatable). 
 151. Paul Wilhelm, Application of Distributive Justice Theory to the CEO Pay Problem: 
Recommendations for Reform, 12 J. BUS. ETHICS 469, 477 (1993). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, OXFORD REV. 
ECON. POL’Y 283, 284 (Summer 2005); see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 
ECON. 305, 325-28 (1976) (concluding that perquisite consumption like automobiles, use of 
corporate jets, and country club memberships is a diversion of company resources that 
results in reduction of firm value); cf. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and The Theory of 
the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 296 (1980) (taking the position that CEO use of company 
perks are a cost to the company only if they are not offset by smaller paychecks). 
 154. Jared Harris, What’s Wrong with Executive Compensation?, 85 J. BUS. ETHICS 147, 
150 (2008). 
 155. See generally John Dobson, Ethics in Finance II, 53 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 15, 16 
(Jan/Feb 1997): 
Thus, the “virtuous agent” is involved in a continual quest to find balance in 
decision making. Such an agent does not apply any specific rules in making 
decisions but rather attempts to make decisions that are consistent with the 
pursuit of a particular kind of excellence that, in turn, entails exercising sound 
moral judgment guided by such virtues as courage, wisdom, temperance, 
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Business as a calling to “professionalism” calls forth far more humility and 
public responsibility than we have seen in the recent culture of 
extraordinary compensation.156  All of these ethical perspectives are 
consistent with the viewpoint, most recently expressed by Rakesh Khurana 
at the Harvard Business School, that business leaders must be 
“professionals” and move beyond a view that economic self-interest will 
suffice for either self, corporation, or the social good.157
In light of the foregoing, ethicists espouse moral obligations of the 
board to ensure that pay packages effectively align pay and performance 
and are the result of a transparent, non-exclusive process.
 
158
 
fairness, integrity, and consistency. 
  In terms of the 
process of hiring and compensation decisions, most commentators agree 
that lack of independence (in its extreme forms, cronyism) is a breach of 
the board’s fiduciary duties that can best be avoided with non-exclusivity 
Id. at 16; see also MAX DEPREE, LEADERSHIP IS AN ART (1989).  DePree has written one of 
the best short books on ethics and leadership.  When Max DePree was CEO of Herman 
Miller, Inc., he wrote about leadership and ethics in this way: 
  Try to think about a leader, in the words of the gospel writer Luke, as “one 
who serves.” Leadership is a concept of owing certain things to the institution. 
It is a way of thinking about institutional heirs, a way of thinking about 
stewardship as contrasted with ownership. Robert Greenleaf has written an 
excellent book about this idea, Servant Leadership. 
  The art of leadership requires us to think about the leader-as-steward in terms 
of relationships: of assets and legacy, of momentum and effectiveness, of 
civility and values. 
Dobson, supra, at 12. 
 156. The U.S. culture of compensation likely derives from the philosophical primacy of 
finance and economics over an older set of aims (pre-World War II) in business education:  
social responsibility and professionalism.  Rakesh Khurana et al., Is Business Management a 
Profession?, HARVARD BUS. SCH. WORKING KNOWLEDGE, Feb. 21, 2005, 
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/4650.html.  This could explain the premium that U.S. executives 
receive in comparison with the rest of the world.  See Wilhelm, supra note 152, at 469 
(stating extraordinarily large compensation packages are more common in the United States 
than in other industrialized democracies); see also supra notes 40-41 (showing U.S. CEO 
compensation well above other countries). 
 157. Khurana et al., supra note 156; see also RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO 
HIRED HANDS: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION (2007). 
 158. Harris, supra note 154, at 152.  In business ethics parlance, these duties are 
essentially a utilitarian demand that is part and parcel of executing the Board’s moral and 
fiduciary duty of utmost care.  While the ethics literature sometimes talks in terms of 
“fiduciary duties,” this legal precept is also infused with ethical dimensions such as due 
diligence, accountability, integrity, transparency, independence, and public responsibility.  
Diligence, transparency, and independence are particularly important concerns for many 
commentators with respect to a board’s responsibilities.  See Perel, supra note 20, at 381; 
see also discussion supra Part III. 
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and transparency.159  A number of studies attempt to recommend how 
boards can best align pay and performance for the good of the company.160  
Others focus on how board members will only accomplish alignment by 
being independent, using due diligence in crafting compensation packages, 
and being transparent in how they go about hiring and compensating top 
management.161  Still others stress not only transparency, but also 
accountability, integrity, and public responsibility.162
 Correspondingly, ethicists have recently focused on the executive 
being hired.  The literature expressly imposes a moral duty regarding 
compensation.  Professor Moriarty contends that the CEO has a fiduciary 
duty to accept the minimum effective compensation–-the minimum amount 
necessary to attract, retain, and motivate the CEO to maximize firm 
value.
 
163  Likewise, Professor Bragues asserts that a virtuous executive, one 
with strong character values, would not accept the highest possible amount 
if it might conceivably harm others within the firm.164  Professor Sayles 
also reminds us that even a generous but fair compensation package meant 
to align performance and pay can be manipulated by CEOs to achieve the 
desired personal benefits.165  Thus, back-dating options, managing earnings 
through the accounting process, and presenting a false face to the public is 
extremely self-interested and hardly consistent with CEOs’ fiduciary and 
ethical duties.166
In short, not only directors but also CEOs have moral duties regarding 
appropriate compensation.  These ethical obligations arise both at the hiring 
and initial compensation stage and thereafter.  Where the executive has 
 
 
 159. Harris, supra note 154, at 152; Perel, supra note 20, at 381. 
 160. Walters et al., supra note 19, at 227.  Exercising due diligence as part of their 
fiduciary duties also requires sensitivity to the corporate culture; hiring a poor fit, or a good 
fit at a rate of compensation that unnerves or disables esprit de corps within managerial 
ranks can be a failure of fiduciary duty as well.  Wilhelm, supra note 151, at 477. 
 161. Ella Mae Matsumura & Jae Yong Shin, Corporate Governance Reform and CEO 
Compensation: Intended and Unintended Consequences, 62 J. BUS. ETHICS 101, 104 (Dec. 
2005). 
 162. Avshalom M. Adam & Mark S. Schwartz, Corporate Governance, Ethics, and the 
Backdating of Stock Options, 85 J. BUS. ETHICS 225, 226 (2009). 
 163. Moriarty, supra note 15, at 235; see also supra note 163 (advising that what justice 
requires as an ethical matter with respect to executive compensation will require a complete 
theory of justice in wages). 
 164. George Bragues, The Ancients Against the Moderns: Focusing on the Character of 
Corporate Leaders, 78 J. BUS. ETHICS 373, 380 (2008). 
 165. Leonard R. Sayles, The Tipping Point: How Good Executives Go Bad, 11 CORP. 
FIN. REV. 18, 20-21 (2006). 
 166. Id.; see also Story & Dash, supra note 25 (“There are some real ethical questions 
[concerning paying bonuses] given the bailouts and the precariousness of so many of these 
financial institutions[.]” (quoting Jesse M. Brill, chairman of the California-based research 
firm, CompensationStandards.com)).  For specific examples of CEO misconduct, see infra 
Part VI.B. 
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accepted a position within the company that awards extraordinary 
compensation or engages in questionable practices concerning her pay 
package in a way that risks the company’s future for present personal gain, 
she has engaged in unethical conduct that could well amount to unclean 
hands.167
C.  Sanctity of Contract and the Risk of Raising Pay 
 
While promise-keeping, particularly honoring contractual obligations, 
also has an ethical foundation,168 a CEO’s ethical duties to the company 
should outweigh the sanctity of contract in cases of excessive pay.  This is 
especially true where the executive knowingly compromises the long-term 
viability of the firm or manages earnings to enhance personal profits rather 
than focusing on the financial health of the company.169
 
 167. See Ertimur et al., supra note 42 (noting that executive pay has become a key 
corporate governance theme due to the alleged role of high-powered incentives in the 
corporate scandals of 2000-2002); see also Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, Does Backdating 
Explain the Stock Price Pattern Around Executive Stock Option Grants?, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 
271, (2007) (discussing the option backdating scandal); David Yermack, Golden 
Handshakes: Separation Pay for Retired and Dismissed CEOs, 41 J. ACCT. ECON. 237, 240 
(2006) (explaining large severance payments made to departing CEOs are a type payoff to 
rid the company of the bad leadership); David Yermack, Flights of Fancy: Corporate Jets, 
CEO Perquisites, and Inferior Shareholder Returns, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 211, 230 (2006) 
(stating that once corporate leaders get perquisites, corporate performance often falls). 
  Certainly, 
 168. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION (1982) (discussing the promise or moral-based nature of contracts); see also 
DIMATTEO, supra note 123, at 24 (noting the need to honor one’s contract was deemed a 
solemn moral duty); id. at 5, 10 (providing examples of Christian and Jewish responses to 
the failure to keep contractual promises (citing STEPHEN M. PASSAMANECH, THE 
TRADITIONAL JEWISH LAW OF SALE 205 (1983) (explaining the formal condemnation before 
the rabbinical court of someone who did not keep a contractual promise))); RICHARD H. 
HELMHOLZ, CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND 263, 287-88 (London: Hambledon 
Press, 1987) (discussing how the failure to fulfill a contractual promise made under oath 
posed the risk of excommunication). 
 169. Prime examples are the three bank executives who were called to testify before 
Congress in March 2008 about their rich pay at the time that their firms were losing billions 
in the housing and credit crisis they helped engineer.  Elizabeth MacDonald, Final Thoughts 
on the Fat Cat CEO Pay Hearing, FOXBUSINESS, Mar. 9, 2008, 
http://emac.blogs.foxbusiness.com/2008/03/07/highlights-from-the-fat-cat-hearing-today 
(discussing testimony of Angelo Mozilo, head of Countrywide Financial, the nation’s 
biggest mortgage lender, E. Stanley O’Neal, former CEO of Merrill Lynch, and Charles 
Prince, former CEO of Citigroup, who were collectively paid $460 million over five years 
while their companies lost more than $20 billion in last two quarters of 2007).  O’Neal was 
allowed to retire and received $161.5 million in exit pay when Merrill Lynch reported $18 
billion in write-downs related to risky mortgages and its stock price had fallen to nearly half 
its value.  Id.  Prince was allowed to resign and received roughly $30 million, including a 
cash bonus of more than $10 million, millions of dollars in unvested restricted stock and 
stock options, and perquisites worth $1.5 million annually.  Id.  Prince even got a 
performance bonus in 2007 when Citigroup (like Merrill Lynch) took more than $18 billion 
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allowing companies to escape contract liability raises the possibility that it 
may deter executives from serving at the helm.170  But studies from the 
business academies and elsewhere suggest that companies may not want 
those kinds of leaders in the first place.171  Excessive pay packages 
continue to be justified as the “free market” finding of the competitive 
price of top managerial talent.  However, many observers point out that the 
market is somewhat skewed by a number of factors.172  Directors are also 
often mistaken in their estimation of the efficacy of incentivizing CEOs and 
other top management.173
Additionally, along with narrowing the pool of potential executives, 
there is the possibility that the availability of unclean hands could result in 
higher CEO pay.  Financial economists might claim that by decreasing pay 
predictability, the CEO would seek a risk premium to compensate for it.  
Even assuming an executive could accomplish that aim, the idea of 
acoustic separation suggests that the application of unclean hands in an 
 
 
in write-downs related to the subprime and credit crisis and its stock dropped by almost half.  
Id.  For a discussion of Mozilo, see infra notes 231-35 and accompanying text. 
 170. Edward M. Liddy, the government-appointed chairman of AIG (now 80% 
government-owned), attempted to justify the multi-million dollar bonuses to company 
executives and managers in the unit that caused the financial collapse of the company and 
the broader U.S. economy as necessary to keep the most skilled executives, and argued they 
should not be subject to arbitrary adjustment by the U.S. Treasury.  Andrews & Baker, 
supra note 24. 
 171. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the 
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 785 (2002) (“It is important to 
emphasize that the cost to the shareholders resulting from the extraction of rents [by the 
CEO] might well be higher than the amount of the rents themselves.  To the extent that rent 
extraction involves efficiency costs—due, in particular, to the adoption of inefficient 
compensation arrangements—the shareholders’ losses will be larger than the rents extracted 
by managers.”); see also Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note 15, at 54 (noting the 
plethora of evidence on CEOs responding predictably to dysfunctional compensation 
arrangements).  Scholars studying executive compensation agreements agree that optimal 
contracting concerns do not explain the level and structure of CEO pay, but differ on the 
reasons for it.  Compare Bebchuk et al., supra (relying on features of stock option plans to 
argue that managerial power and captured boards design pay plans to transfer rents to CEOs 
in ways that mitigate public outrage) with Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note 15 
(relying on the same evidence for the alternative hypothesis that companies and their 
managers erroneously perceive the cost of granting options to be far below their economic 
cost). 
 172. See generally Wilhelm, supra note 151, at 469.  For example, executive searches 
are often “exclusive” and do not include women and minorities, compensation consultants 
have a strong upward influence on the range of compensation, tax advantages are factored 
into the packages (thus making use of public resources rather than strictly free market 
mechanisms), and the process is not always open and competitive.  Id.  Board members, 
even though they do have fiduciary duties, are essentially using “other people’s money,” 
which invariably raises the “market” price.  Id. 
 173. See Harris, supra note 154, at 147 (discussing the structuring of managerial 
incentives); see also Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note 15 at 59 (discussing 
incentivizing in the context of the relationship between compensation and performance). 
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effort to reduce excessive compensation would not yield a contradictory 
outcome. 
A condition of “acoustic separation”174 assumes that a rule of 
conduct—like contracts are binding as embodied in the common law 
concept of pancta sunt servanda—and a standard of decision—like the 
equitable doctrine of “clean hands”—can operate in tandem and fulfill the 
policy functions of both precepts.175  The dual system, however, is 
dependent on the public being at least partially unaware that the rigid rule 
is actually more lenient in application.176  This hidden exception to rule-
based decision-making provides selective transmission.177  As a result, 
there is a partial separation between the rule of conduct and the rule of 
decision such that the law can successfully pursue both ends.178
Scholars have studied the theory of acoustic separation in equity and 
agree that equitable defenses operate under partial acoustic separation.
 
179  
Professor Emily Sherwin advanced the concept of acoustic separation in 
justifying equitable defenses in contract law.180
 
 174. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic 
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984) (using “acoustic separation” to 
describe a situation where the general public and the rule-making officials are separated into 
acoustically sealed chambers). 
  She concluded that public 
 175. Id. at 630-34 (distinguishing conduct rules and decision rules of acoustic 
separation). 
 176. Id. (discussing the conflict between the normative message of acoustic separation 
and the actuality of its implementation).  Partial acoustic separation can occur any time 
certain normative messages are more likely to be understood by officials than by the public.  
Id. at 633-34 (elaborating on normative messages). 
 177. Id. at 635 (explaining how the law attempts to segregate messages to the public 
from messages to officials). 
 178. Professor Sherwin explains the benefits of acoustic separation: 
Acoustic separation suggests a way for the authority to escape this dilemma, by 
deceiving citizens about the force of the rule in official decisions. In other 
words, the authority might hold out to private parties a determinate rule, with 
implicit or explicit instructions that the rule will be enforced by courts. At the 
same time, it might provide courts with a less determinate standard that calls for 
direct application of the underlying norm to particular cases. If this standard can 
be obscured from public view, it will not affect the weight of the rule in the 
citizens' calculations. The authority can capture the value of rules at the level of 
public conduct, but leave judicial decisions open to a broader range of 
justifications. 
Emily L. Sherwin, Law and Equity in Contract Enforcement, 50 MD. L. REV. 253, 306 
(1991). 
 179. Id. at 306 (“Remedies are remote from lay understandings of law.  Equitable 
remedies, and the various secondary limitations on damages that make specific performance 
important, are remoter still.”); Gail L. Heriot, A Study in the Choice of Form: Statutes of 
Limitations and the Doctrine of Laches, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 917, 949 (“In general, the 
common law is considerably more familiar to both lay persons and their attorneys than is 
equity.”). 
 180. Sherwin, supra note 178, at 307 (“The legal model of enforcement is conduct-
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ignorance of the equitable defense of fairness allowed courts to use it to 
achieve fairness and justice without sacrificing the pursuit of stability in 
contract law.181  Simply put, “[t]he legal model of enforcement tells the 
public that contracts will be enforced, while the equitable model gives 
relief from hardship in particular cases.”182
If these assumptions are correct, the obscurity of the equitable doctrine 
of “clean hands” similarly permits fairness-based adjudication without 
sacrificing conduct values.  In the context of CEO compensation, the 
implication of acoustic separation means that executives will have only 
limited cognizance of the defense and, consequently, will fail to negotiate 
in anticipation of it.
 
183  However, while the obscurity of equitable defenses 
may be accurate in other contexts, the existing economic upheaval has 
pushed CEO compensation to the forefront of public consciousness.184  As 
such, court action in curtailing excessive executive compensation with the 
doctrine of “clean hands” would likely not go unnoticed.  Yet the 
heightened public and political scrutiny (as well as forthcoming reforms) of 
bold executives who have used the name of business to “gild their crimes” 
would also make it more difficult for CEOs to negotiate higher 
compensation.185
 
oriented and rule-based. The equitable model is better suited to remedial goals and 
particularistic [sic] decisionmaking.”). 
  If they do succeed, and their employment agreement 
 181. Id. at 308 (maintaining that the lack of public awareness of the equitable fairness 
defense is because the public does not know remedies and because lawyers will not research 
remedies after the breach or at the transaction stage).  Professor Gail Heriot makes a similar 
argument with respect to the equitable defense of laches.  Heriot, supra note 179, at 949-51; 
see also Anenson, Post-Merger Justification of Unclean Hands, supra note 29, at 463 
(noting laches and unclean hands share a similar procedural posture). 
 182. Sherwin, supra note 178, at 308. 
 183. The extension of unclean hands to legal actions indicates that litigants and their 
attorneys will become aware of it.  See Ralph A. Newman, The Place and Function of Pure 
Equity in the Structure of Law, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 401, 426-27 (1965) (discussing the effects 
of available defenses on remedies granted); Andrew J. Wistrich, Procrastination, Deadlines, 
and Statutes of Limitation, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 607, 656 (2008) (explaining that 
damages are the “most common and desired remedy”).   Nevertheless, while executives may 
become aware of the defense, they still will not know when and if it will apply due to the 
uncertainty of its application under the circumstances.  See Sherwin, supra note 178, at 302 
n.222 (noting parallel in Bentham’s design (as interpreted by Postema) to Dan-Cohen’s 
model of acoustic separation in that the rules of law would not be determinative in 
adjudication, which would have no precedential value, and therefore would not alter the 
conduct rules (citing GERALD POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 403-
08 (1986))).  This is probably why law and equity have been seen as the perfect rule-
standard pair for centuries.  Infra note 193.  The board of directors, however, should be 
aware of the defense in order to encourage them to withhold payment under appropriate 
circumstances and risk a breach of contract action. 
 184. See supra notes 14, 17-18 and accompanying text. 
 185. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, ESSAYS (FIRST AND SECOND SERIES) 44 (1990) (Self-
Reliance). 
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permits exorbitant pay under the circumstances, unclean hands would be 
available to ensure that they do not receive or keep the excessive amount. 
In any event, the goal of the defense is not to decrease pay overall or 
even to best align pay with performance.  Rather, the purpose of unclean 
hands is to provide justice in individual cases.186  In the context of CEO 
pay, application of the defense means that business leaders who are morally 
and legally accountable to shareholders will not get away with excessively-
lined pockets caused by their own ethical lapses and reckless choices.187  
To the extent that executives have dirtied their otherwise “clean hands,” 
courts will not allow them to profit from their actions and thereby preserve 
the integrity of the judicial system in the process.188
VI.    USING “CLEAN HANDS” IN CEO COMPENSATION CASES 
 
Finally, notwithstanding recent scholarship to the contrary, the judicial 
system can and should discern overcompensation through the doctrine of 
“clean hands.”189
 
 186. Clawbacks and nonbinding shareholder “say on pay” votes operate in a similarly 
discreet fashion.  Supra Part II.A. & B; see also infra Part VI.B. (outlining circumstances 
for a court to consider in applying unclean hands).  The doctrine of “clean hands” protects 
the parties and the court.  E.g., Gaudiosi v. Mellon, 269 F.2d 873, 881 (3d Cir. 1959); 
Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co., 719 N.W.2d 809, 818 (Mich. 2006); Kendall-Jackson 
Winery Ltd. v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. Rptr.2d 743, 749 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). 
  As a practical matter, courts are competent to measure 
 187. See, e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 
806, 815 (1945) (explaining that the doctrine prevents “a wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits 
of his [or her] transgression”); Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 
245 (1933) (emphasizing that a complainant can only have standing if he comes into court 
with clean hands); Fairway Developers, Inc. v. Marcum, 832 N.E.2d 581, 585 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2005) (“The purpose of the unclean hands doctrine is to prevent a party from reaping 
benefits from his misconduct.”); Kendall-Jackson Winery Ltd. v. Superior Court, 90 
Cal.Rptr.2d 743, 749 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (opining that unclean hands doctrine makes the 
wrongdoer litigant “answer for his [or her] own misconduct in the action”). 
 188. See, e.g., Chafee II, supra note 34, at 1091 (concluding that unclean hands is not 
peculiar to equity given that it considers the plaintiff’s fault but is “a general principle 
running through damage actions as well as suits for specific relief”).  The Supreme Court 
explained the rationale of unclean hands:  “Th[e] doctrine is rooted in the historical concept 
of court of equity as a vehicle for affirmatively enforcing the requirements of conscience 
and good faith.  This presupposes a refusal on its part to be the abettor of iniquity.” 
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945) 
(internal quotation and citation omitted). 
 189. See Markham, supra note 60 (reviewing fiduciary duty law and questioning the 
competence of courts to establish a metric of excessive executive compensation).  While we 
agree with Professor Markham that existing laws have not yet solved the problem of 
executive compensation, we disagree with his underlying thesis (as we understand it) that 
because law has not yet cured the excessive executive pay problem, we should quit trying to 
use it.  Id. (arguing that it should be left to the market to control executive pay excesses).  
The power and prestige of the ancient chancellors did not derive from the fact that they were 
able to definitively resolve the perennial problems of life through law, but rather because 
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excessive pay that amounts to unclean hands in order to check CEO 
compensation.  They have used a similar metric of unreasonableness of pay 
in other corporate contexts.  Assessing when “excessive” equals “unclean” 
can also be made by reference to quantitative and qualitative determinants 
used in the growing accounting, finance, economics, and management 
literature on the subject.  Ethical considerations and prevailing public 
morality should also play a role.190
A. Institutional Competence 
 
With any discretionary decision, there is a risk of arbitrariness and 
error in the adjudication process.191  The possibility of uncertain and 
inconsistent outcomes is not unique to equity or unclean hands,192
 
they understood and became a part of the mystery.  See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, 
58 TEXAS L. REV. 695, 775 n.323 (1980) (discussing the challenges of legal interpretation 
and the goal of achieving justice:  “Like the grub that builds its chamber for the winged 
thing it has never seen but is to be . . . .” (quoting a speech by Oliver Wendell Holmes 
reprinted in LAW AND THE COURT, THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES 168, 174 (M. Howe ed. 1962))).  The inexhaustible circumstances of life are a 
constant stimulus for creativity and reform.  Equity is particularly well-suited to be an 
engine of change.  Anenson, supra note 111; accord DIMATTEO, supra note 123, at 7. 
 but 
 190. See discussion supra Part V.B. 
 191. See, e.g., Steve Hedley, Rival Taxonomies Within Obligations: Is There a 
Problem?, in EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 93, at 77, 87 (advocating the 
continued use of equity but noting that there will be legitimate concerns over the degree of 
flexibility that should be allowed (citing articles on debate about “discretionary 
remedialism”)); Smith, supra note 93, at 38 (noting that uncertainty and inconsistency are 
two different vices of discretion); Honorable Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About 
Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982) (discussing the importance of “broad judicial 
review” in preserving various principles of jurisprudence); Doug Rendleman, The Trial 
Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following Ebay v. MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63, 64 
(2007) (citing articles devoted to discretion in substance, procedure, and jurisprudence); see 
also NEWMAN, supra note 110, at 19-20 (citing “equality” as one of the necessary virtues of 
justice (quoting FREDERICK POLLOCK, JURISPRUDENCE 37 (5th ed. 1923))); Main, supra note 
113, at 444 (“[T]here is no more fundamental social interest than that law should be uniform 
and impartial.”). 
 192. Chafee II, supra note 34, at 1079 (listing examples of unclean hands decisions 
where the judicial preoccupation with morality led to an increase in immorality); see also 
Harold Greville Hanbury, The Field of Modern Equity, in ESSAYS IN EQUITY 32 (1934) 
(describing the “golden age” of equity as beginning during the time of Lord Nottingham 
who began the transformation of equity “from a heterogeneous medley of isolated, empirical 
beliefs into a stable and increasingly rigid system of rules” until the first years of the 
nineteenth century); JOHN SELDON, TABLE TALK 49 (Books for Libraries Press, 1927) (1855) 
(quoting Seldon’s famous words that equity varied with the length of the chancellor’s foot); 
Patrick S. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial 
Process and the Law, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1251-59 (1980) (describing how English 
equity and the common law lost flexibility in the nineteenth century followed by a 
resurgence of discretion after the merger of law and equity in the twentieth century).  
Readers may also remember that it was Charles Dickens, in BLEAK HOUSE, who portrayed 
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pervades all aspects of laws that are measured by standards rather than 
rules.193  Nonetheless, a benefit of discretion is the courts’ ability to capture 
the wide range of misbehaviors associated with the defense.194  What is 
“unclean,” like what is fraud, necessitates some ambiguity to promote 
deterrence.195
It is not hope alone, but the wisdom of the ages that supports equitable 
intervention into executive employment contracts.
 
196  Too often, in our 
industrial and now information age, we attempt to create theories that 
objectify law in order to solve moral and political problems in the way that 
businesses use technology to solve physical problems.197
 
the arrogance and delay of the English chancery courts through the metaphor of the fog that 
never lifts.  See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 14 (Nicola Bradbury ed., Penguin 
Classics 2003) (1853) (“Never can there come fog too thick . . . which this High Court of 
Chancery, most pestilent of hoary sinners, holds, this day . . . .”). 
  Supreme Court 
jurisprudence shows that legal interpretation has not been immune from 
this cultural influence.  But law (especially equity), like ethics, is a form of 
 193. The rules-standards debate has been a popular academic discussion.  The key 
question is how much uncertainty is tolerable in the area of law that the defense is applied.  
See MindGames, Inc. v. W. Publ’g Co., 218 F.3d 652, 656-57 (7th Cir. 2000) (“No sensible 
person supposes that rules are always superior to standards, or vice versa . . . .”). 
 194. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 
815 (1945) (“[Unclean hands] necessarily gives wide range to the equity court’s use of 
discretion in refusing to aid the unclean litigant.”); MEGARRY & BAKER, supra note 111, at 
105-06 (discussing how details of a trust in a property law case may not necessarily be 
produced in writing but rather through extrinsic evidence); NEWMAN, supra note 110, at 28 
(“Relief in the court of the Chancellor was granted according to criteria which were not 
confined by rules of strict logic or by analogy to prior decisions.”); see also Smith, supra 
note 93, at 38 (discussing the relationship between equity and law and noting that discretion 
is not necessarily an injustice); Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The 
Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359, 380 (1975) 
(discussing the obvious inappropriateness of denying discretion when a decision-maker 
must choose among an almost infinite number of alternatives on bases that are complex and 
yield uncertain conclusions); Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Judge, 
Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 662 (1971) (“Many questions that arise in 
litigation are not amenable to regulation by rule because they involve multifarious, fleeting, 
special, narrow facts that utterly resist generalization . . . .”).  For the historical origin and 
evolution of equitable discretion generally, see Anenson, supra note 111, at 384-87.  
 195. See discussion supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 196. The “power of discretion” has been considered the “great contribution of equity” to 
the administration of justice.  HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF 
EQUITY 2 (West Pub. Co. 1948) (1936). 
 197. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 185 (1991) (emphasizing the 
necessity of moral decision in adjudication); cf. Arnie Cooper, Computing the Cost, 399 THE 
SUN 4, 11 (Mar. 2009) (noting a conversation with Nicholas Carr, which discusses 
technology and the fear that “a definition of intelligence that discredits the individual mind 
in favor of some automated collective mind will feed powerful systems:  governments, 
corporations, and other large institutions.  And it will emphasize efficiency of thought over 
depth of thought”). 
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practical wisdom.198  It is perception, not simply precepts.  It is not only 
about learning rules, but also about mastering bodies of practice.199  It is 
Cardozo’s intuition and Llewellyn’s “situation sense.”200  In fact, it is the 
very humanness of adjudication that gives our legal system the chance of 
justice.201
Besides, legal theorists tell us that the experiential process of 
precedent moves legal precepts from the abstract to the particular and 
placed.
 
202  Doctrinal analysis over time produces clearly discernable 
decisional patterns.203
 
 198. E.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980) (discussing natural 
law theory and practical wisdom); cf. V.N. Awasthi, Managerial Decision-Making on 
Moral Issues and the Effects of Teaching Ethics, 78 J. BUS. ETHICS 207 (2008) (finding 
ethics courses influence management judgment). 
  Prior articles have traced the pattern of equitable 
 199. E.g., HUHN, supra note 139, at 13; Anenson, supra note 125, at 638. 
 200. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 19, 25 (1922) 
(mentioning that decisions must be felt or that judges must feel their way); KARL N. 
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960) (describing the common law process of 
creating law through the groupings of transaction-types or situation-sense). 
 201. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 197, at 147, 168-69 
(explaining that justice is created out of the process of deciding because there is no meta-
rule or hierarchy among the incommensurable modalities of legal interpretation); id. at 177 
(“The space for moral reflection on our ideologies is created by the conflict among 
modalities, just as garden walls create space for a garden.”).  Resort to the heritage of equity 
also has a normative quality all its own.  Reliance on ancient equitable tradition 
demonstrates that institutions are as faithful as they are fair.  Smith, supra note 93, at 19, 30; 
see also Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 189, at 765 (commenting that use of 
historical argument acknowledges the limits of our wisdom and the modesty of our 
perspective). 
 202. Professor Wilson Huhn’s insight was that standards evolve into rules through the 
use of formalistic analogies that identify the factual similarities in the cases that apply the 
standard.  Wilson R. Huhn, The Stages Of Legal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy and 
Realism, 48 VILL. L. REV. 305, 378-79 (2003).  Rules evolve into standards through the use 
of realistic analogies that identify the interests justifying exceptions to the rule.  Id. at 307 
(proposing that precedent bridges the transition between formalism and realism and vice 
versa); see also Anenson, supra note 125, at 643-51 (illustrating the phenomena in cases 
considering the equitable defense of estoppel).  See generally NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE 
AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT (2008) (providing a historical and philosophical analysis of 
how precedent operates in the common-law system). 
 203. See Huhn, The Stages Of Legal Reasoning, supra note 202, at 308-10 (labeling 
three discrete forms of legalisms as formalism, analogy and realism); cf. Amy Coney 
Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1072 (Summer 2003) 
(“Allowing an issue to be hashed out multiple times compensates for the imperfections—the 
very humanness—in the process of decisionmaking.  It allows the courts to see a more 
complete picture before rushing to judgment.”).  See generally Emily Sherwin, A Defense of 
Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179 (1999) (explaining the benefits of 
judge-made law as providing numerous data for decision-making, representing the 
collaborative efforts of judges over time, correcting the biases that might lead judges to 
discount the force of precedent, and exerting a conservative force in the law to change at a 
gradual pace). 
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integration of unclean hands in legal cases.204
Courts have also evaluated the reasonableness of corporate decisions 
concerning executive compensation in tax cases to determine the 
deductibility of pay in close corporations.
 
205  Excessiveness is also subject 
to a merit-based review of reasonableness in situations of corporate 
takeovers.206  Likewise, legal scholars have suggested similar standards of 
“reasonableness” in testing excessive executive pay packages in the 
fiduciary duty context.207  Additionally, checking compensation levels for 
reasonableness at different times during the contractual relationship is not 
anathema to contract law.  Liquidated damages, for instance, require that 
stipulated damages be reasonable at the time of contracting and at the time 
of breach.208
 
 204. See generally Anenson, Post-Merger Justification of Unclean Hands, supra note 
29.  Cf. Anenson, supra note 125 (discussing equitable estoppel). 
  Executive compensation can be similarly seen from two 
perspectives of reasonableness:  anticipated reasonableness—time of 
entering the contract—and actual reasonableness—time of the payment of 
bonuses or stock options or at severance.  Thus, courts could consider a 
CEO’s conduct ex-ante to contract formation as well as ex-post, such as 
when the executive has engaged in reckless risk-taking.  The sheer size of 
the pay package alone may also be grounds for the dismissal. 
 205. See Martin, supra note 67, at 538 (citing cases).  In Elliotts, Inc. v. C.I.R., the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals articulated a five-factor inquiry for the reasonableness of 
compensation:  (1) the employee’s role in the company; (2) a comparison of the employee’s 
salary with those paid by similar companies for similar services; (3) the character and 
condition of the company; (4) potential conflicts of interest; and (5) evidence of an internal 
inconsistency in a company’s treatment of payments to employees.  716 F.2d 1241, 1245-47 
(9th Cir. 1983).  The court additionally advised that when conducting the reasonableness 
inquiry, “it is helpful to consider the matter from the perspective of a hypothetical 
independent investor.  A relevant inquiry is whether an inactive, independent investor would 
be willing to compensate the employee as he was compensated.”  Id. at 1245. 
 206. See Martin, supra note 67, at 538 (citing cases). 
 207. See, e.g., Barris, supra note 103, at 59 (arguing for testing of the reasonableness of 
compensation by comparing compensation levels with those of similar firms); Vagts, supra 
note 103, at 252-61 (same); Yablon, supra note 103, at 1897-99 (reviewing GRAEF 
CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES 
(1991) (arguing for an intermediate level of scrutiny in reviewing compensation packages)); 
see also Thomas & Martin, supra note 95, at 599-605 (discussing the arguments on both 
sides). 
 208. Larry A. DiMatteo & T. Leigh Anenson, Teaching Law and Theory Through 
Context: Contract Clauses in Legal Studies Education, 24 J. LEG. STUD. EDUC. 19, 41-42 
(2007); see also Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of 
Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 633 (2001) (critiquing the law of liquidated damages 
and suggesting that the separate rules for reviewing the liquidated damages clause be 
eliminated in favor of the doctrine of unconscionability). 
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B.  Measuring Excessive Pay 
Along with existing ethical principles and common law considerations 
of reasonableness, a workable framework for determining when excessive 
is unclean can be derived from business practice.  There is much to be 
learned from business scholars who have been testing the causes and 
implications of excessive executive pay.  By way of background, CEO 
contracts are typically for a period of five years and specify a base salary, 
annual bonus payments, stock options, and long-term incentive plans.209
A starting point of determining unclean conduct in seeking contracted 
for compensation that is excessive under the circumstances could be an 
economic one.
 
210  Excessive could be measured as pay relative to the 
market, industry, or firm performance.211  Since there is widespread use of 
the controversial practice of competitive benchmarking,212
 
 209. Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note 15, at 3, 5.  While base salary 
comprises a declining percentage of overall compensation, see Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. 
Leibman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J. ECON. 653 (1998) (noting that 
stock options became the largest component of executive pay for all industries except 
utilities in the 1990s), it is still important given that most parts of the compensation package, 
such as target bonuses and option grants, are measured relative to the base salary level.  
Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note 15, at 10 (noting that each dollar increase in 
base salary has positive impact on the other compensation components).  Defined pension 
benefits and severance arrangements also depend on salary levels.  Id. 
 the amount and 
 210. See, e.g., Ertimur et al., supra note 42, at 17 (providing economic measure of 
excessive); id. at 23 (explaining that the increase in compensation related shareholder 
proposals may be because investors have easier access to measures of excessive or abusive 
CEO pay in the post-Enron period through governance rating agencies (e.g., The Corporate 
Library)). 
 211. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 85.  For instance, contracts typically award CEOs 
large blocks of stock options to align their interests with company shareholders.  Randall S. 
Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock Option 
Plans, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 37-38 (2000).  However, contract terms usually do not 
restrict executives from engaging in derivative transactions with their options based on 
factors other than firm performance.  Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An 
Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 264 (2006) (explaining that out of a data set of 271 executive 
contracts with stock option compensation, only five restricted their sale, only three restricted 
or prohibited hedging, and none restricted or prohibited pledging); cf. David M. Schizer, 
Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundations of Incentive Compatibility, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 440, 460 (2000) (claiming that stock option restrictions and insider trading 
policies constrain executive hedging or pledging of stock options). 
 212. Scholars claim that benchmarking in the form of industry median compensation 
statistics raises pay independent of CEO or firm performance.  See, e.g., Paul Oyer, Why Do 
Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?, 59 J. FIN. 1619 (2004).  An 
alternative view is that benchmarking represents an efficient way to determine the 
reservation wage of the CEO.  See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of US 
Corporate Governance: What’s Right and What’s Wrong, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 19 
(2003) (“The main problem with executive pay levels is not the overall level, but the 
extreme skew in the awards . . . . To deal with this problem, we need more effective 
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kind of pay package relative to industry peer groups should be analyzed 
while scrutinizing how the proposed peer group was constituted.213
The quantitative metric would be assessed along with other qualitative 
indicators.
 
214  Such factors may include the managerial skill requirements, 
job complexity, and span of control.215  Additional criteria for earnings 
levels would include age, experience, education, and performance.216  The 
need for retention in a tight labor market and any other indicia of CEO 
quality or job skills other than firm performance could also be 
considered.217
In addition to a substantive review, the decision-making process of 
 
 
benchmarking[,] not less of it.”). 
 213. Use of competitive benchmarking based on industry salary surveys is nearly 
universal in CEO contracts.  See John M. Bizjak et al., Does the Use of Peer Groups 
Contribute to Higher Pay and Less Efficient Compensation?, 90 J. FIN. ECON. 152, 153 
(2008) (finding 96 of 100 randomly selected firms from the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index in 
1997 used competitive benchmarking); Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note 15, at 
9.  The practice has generated considerable controversy.  Some fear that setting pay by peer 
groups would institutionalize those components of pay that are not directly linked to 
performance measures.  Bizjak et al., supra, at 213.  CEOs themselves and directors have 
expressed concerns about its “ratchet” effect on salaries irrespective of performance and the 
predilections of the board to place its CEO in the top half of the peer group so the company 
looks strong.  Id. (quoting Walter Wriston, former chairman and CEO of Citicorp, and 
member of the compensation committee at General Electric Co. in the Wall Street Journal 
in 1991 and Edgar Woolard Jr., former CEO of Dupont and director at IBM, Apple, and 
Citigroup in the Harvard Business Review in 2003); see also Brian Hall, Six Challenges to 
Designing Equity-Based Pay, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 21 (2003) (noting rise in pay per 
salary surveys is consistent with the views of executives and salary consultants themselves). 
 214. See W. VON LEYDEN, ARISTOTLE ON EQUALITY AND JUSTICE 12 (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1985) (explaining that Aristotle’s concept of just price was subjective, while 
Thomas Aquinas objectified the economic exchange); DIMATTEO, supra note 123, at 17 
(noting that “there was not one, but many conceptions of just price” in early contract law). 
 215. See Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note 15, at 9 (discussing metrics used 
to determine CEO base salaries). 
 216. Id.; see also Kevin J. Murphy, Incentives, Learning and Compensation: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts, 17 RAND J. ECON. 
59 (1986) (arguing that boards learn about CEOs over time and reward those with great 
ability). 
 217. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, 
How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them, 34 (European 
Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper No. 44, 2004), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=561305 (noting that “the managerial 
labor market has become relatively more important for top executives in the US”).  For 
instance, labor market considerations play a significant role in firms’ decisions to re-price 
employee stock options.  Mary Ellen Carter & Luann J. Lynch, An Examination of 
Executive Stock Option Repricing, 61 J. FIN. ECON. 207 (2001); N.K. Chidambaran & 
Nagpurnanand R. Prabhala, Executive Stock Option Repricing, Internal Governance 
Mechanisms, and Management Turnover, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 153 (2003); see also Bizjak et al., 
supra note 213, at 164 (concluding that benchmarking pay with peer groups to gauge the 
market wage is an efficient way to determine pay for retention purposes). 
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setting compensation levels should be evaluated in light of the so-called 
“crony capitalism” that can constitute corporate management.218  Courts are 
certainly aware of the possibility of management capture as well as 
industry best practices like the use of compensation consultants relative to 
pay setting procedures.219  Additional considerations in evaluating 
executive pay decisions may include board leadership style, ethical values, 
strategies, as well as conflict management.220  Corresponding motives of 
the CEO could also be considered.221  In conjunction with fiduciary duty 
law,222 unclean hands may at least be better than after-the-fact emergency 
legislation to “inspire a true sense of ethical obligation.”223
 
 218. LAUFER, supra note 8, at 196-97.  See, e.g., Garvey & Milbourn, supra note 28 
(finding that CEOs are paid more for good luck than they are punished for bad luck that is 
indicative of the CEO’s ability to act opportunistically in setting pay).  For a discussion of 
the negotiation and contract terms for Countrywide CEO, Angelo Mozilo, see infra notes 
231-35. 
 
 219. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 55-58 (Del. 2006) (listing 
procedures such as use of compensation expert); cf. Martin, supra note 67, at 519 (noting 
compliance may obviate shareholder litigation but not prevent excessive compensation 
packages since best practices contemplate procedural safeguards, not substantive ones); 
accord Brian Cadman et al., The Role and Effect of Compensation Consultants on CEO Pay 
(2007) (Wharton School Working Paper, on file with authors) (suggesting that executive 
pay schemes reflect more efficient contracting when consultants are involved in the 
compensation process). 
           The use of compensation consultants in designing executive pay packages has risen 
over the past few years.  Id. (citing Alexandra Higgins, The Effect of Compensation 
Consultants: A Study of Market Share and Compensation Policy Advice, THE CORPORATE 
LIBRARY (2007)) (concluding that stronger governance rules have caused boards to rely on 
the advice of independent consultants); Francesco Guerrera, US companies warned about 
pay advisers, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2006, at 13.  Critics allege that consultants help disguise 
and justify excessive executive pay that helps executives extract wealth from the firm at the 
shareholders’ expense.  Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: 
Overview of the Issues, 20 ACAD. MGMT. PERSPECTIVES 5 (2006); Graef S. Crystal, Why 
CEO Compensation Is So High, 34 CALIF. MGT. REV. 9 (Fall 1991); Gretchen Morgenson, 
Gilded Paychecks: Troubling Conflicts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006. 
 220. See Jeffrey Sonnenfield, Good Governance and the Misleading Myths of Bad 
Metrics, 18 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 108, 112 (2004) (“At least as important are the human 
dynamics of boards as social systems where leadership character, individual values, 
decision-making processes, conflict management, and strategic thinking will truly 
differentiate a firm’s governance.”). 
 221. Moriarty, supra note 15 (defining the ethical duty of the CEO regarding her 
compensation subjectively); see also DIMATTEO, supra note 123, at 14 (noting controversy 
in the calculation of just price:  “Is it the market price, that being the price that the market 
will bear? Or is it the amount the particular purchaser is willing to pay?”).  Evaluating 
motive and conduct under all the circumstances is also the mainstay of the interference tort.  
See T. Leigh Anenson, Creating Conflicts of Interest: Litigation as Interference with the 
Attorney-Client Relationship, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 173 (2006) (analyzing the tort of 
interference). 
 222. As discussed supra Part III, the usefulness of the “clean hands” doctrine depends in 
part on board’s willingness to withhold pay under appropriate circumstances. 
 223. William H. Donaldson, Corporate Governance: What Has Happened and Where 
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Indeed, if the defense of unclean hands had been taken into account 
earlier, it may have deterred the kind of “me-first maneuverings around 
executive pay in corporate America” that have, once again, “generated 
untold millions for aggressive managers and monster losses for unwitting 
taxpayers.”224  At the very least, it could have remedied excessive pay 
where warranted.  It bears repeating that seeking the rescission of salary or 
incentive-based excessive pay or defending a breach of contract action for 
withholding it on the basis of unclean hands may succeed where other 
lawsuits fail and/or where regulatory efforts are lax.225
Recognition of the defense in breach of contract actions may have 
prevented the litigation costs borne by New York taxpayers in the lawsuit 
filed on their behalf against former New York Stock Exchange CEO 
Richard Grasso.
 
226
 
We Need to Go, 38 BUS. ECON. 4 (2003); Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral 
Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 27 n.129 (2003) (noting history of reactionary 
regulation after markets drop); Martin, supra note 67, at 533 (commenting that legislative 
reform punishes wrongdoers and restores investor confidence, but it does not replenish lost 
retirement savings or pensions); Clyde Weiss, Pension Power, AFSCME WORKS 
MAGAZINE, Mar./Apr. 2003, http://www.afscme.org/publications/5346.cfm (last visited 
Mar. 17, 2010) (explaining that the Enron bankruptcy in 2001 caused losses of $1.5 billion 
in retirement assets of AFSCME union members); see also Anenson & Lahey, supra note 
142, at 496, 505-07 (discussing the fiscal distress of the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation that insures corporate pensions in the event of termination).  Professor 
DiMatteo explains Aristotle’s conception of equity and contract:  “The use of equitable 
principles in contracting should function as a praxis for habit-formation in the development 
of the traits of law-abidance and ‘just application of the principles of equality.’”  DIMATTEO, 
supra note 123, at 13 (quoting W. VON LEYDEN, ARISTOTLE ON EQUALITY AND JUSTICE 81 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985)).  Most recently, there are serious questions being 
raised as to whether the House Bill’s attempt to reign in executive pay, if passed, will have 
the desired effect.  See Gretchen Morgenson, Fair Game: Imperfect Politics of Pay, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 09, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/09/business/09gret.html?emc=eta1. 
  Grasso’s rich $186 million retirement package—one of 
Wall Street’s biggest paychecks—was alleged to be excessive and the 
 224. See Morgenson, supra note 219. 
 225. See discussion supra Parts II & III; see also Markham, supra note 60, at 318-19 
(noting difficulty of breach of contract actions against executives for their misconduct and 
citing cases of former CEOs Robert J. O’Connell at Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance 
and Ron Zebeck at Metris).  Although principles of equity support the use of unclean hands 
offensively, there have been no cases to date where litigants have advocated unclean hands 
as a basis for rescission.  See 17 B C.J.S. Contracts § 459 (2009) (discussing grounds for 
partial rescission); see also Tracy A. Thomas, Bailouts, Bonuses and the Return of Unjust 
Gains, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 437, 444 (2009) (citing precedent showing partial rescission of 
a contract is available under extreme circumstances and when the provision to be rescinded 
is severable from the rest of the contract). 
 226. Aaron Lucchetti & Paul Davies, Grasso Braces for Long Battle over Pay Ruling, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2006, at B1 (reporting that attorney fees were estimated to be $100 
million before trial); Markham, supra note 60, at 318 (“[T]he fight over Grasso’s pay is 
becoming a poster child for reasons not to challenge executive pay in court.”). 
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product of manipulation.227  Even Michael Ovitz, a former Disney 
executive, may have had a more difficult time collecting and keeping his 
$140 million severance had the Board raised unclean hands after he badly 
bungled the company during his short tenure.228  During the (last) Great 
Depression, the “clean hands” doctrine may have even been effective to 
help stop the bleeding of companies by CEOs and their outsized pay where 
shareholder litigation on behalf of the company produced only spotty 
results.229
Currently, there is plenty for “clean hands” to cure.  CEO self-
indulgence has shown that “public companies have become largely 
personal ATMs.”
 
230  The conduct of former Countrywide CEO, Angelo 
Mozilo, provides a ready example.231
 
 227. Aaron Lucchetti & Joann S. Lublin, Grasso Is Ordered to Repay Millions in 
Compensation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2006, at A1; Landon Thomas, Jr., Grasso Wins Some 
Rulings in Pay Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2007, at C1; Kate Kelly & Susanne Craig, Spitzer 
Files Suit Seeking Millions of Grasso Money; Action Targets Ex-Chief of NYSE and 
Exchange Over $200 Million Package, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2004, at A1 (discussing 
lawsuit filed by New York Attorney General against the New York Stock Exchange, its 
former Chairman, Dick Grasso, and the former Chairman of the Compensation Committee 
of the Board of Directors and seeking recovery of over $100,000,000 paid to Mr. Grasso as 
compensation which was unreasonable, uninformed, and the product of intimidation); see 
also Markham, supra note 60, at 316 (criticizing Spitzer’s allegations that Grasso was 
overpaid as the chairman of a not-for-profit institution and deceived the Board as to his 
retirement package). 
  His bad behavior exemplifies all the 
 228. See discussion supra Part III; see also JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY 
OF U.S. CORPORATE SCANDALS FROM ENRON TO REFORM 32 (2006) (noting other cases of 
excessive executive compensation at Walt Disney that included Jeffrey Katzenberg, who 
was paid $280 million by Disney to settle his compensation claims, and CEO Michael 
Eisner, who was paid over $750 million “while he was making some colossal management 
blunders as head of the company”). 
 229. Most of these lawsuits stem from the sheer size of the pay as opposed to any after-
contract conduct regarding pay that harmed the company.  See Washington, supra note 60 
(discussing executive pay case concerning executive Charles M. Schwab and Charles 
Mitchell); see also supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 230. Khurana & Zelleke, supra note 4; accord After Rescue, supra note 22 (“‘It’s very 
unfortunate, but a culture of entitlement has emerged among Wall Street executives,’ said 
Peter Morici, a University of Maryland economist. ‘They’re paid far too much money and 
they’re trying to find ways around the rules.’”). 
 231. The SEC’s lawsuit against Mozilo is the highest profile government legal action 
against a CEO in the current financial crisis.  Peter Barnes & Joanna Ossinger, Countrywide 
Ex-CEO Angelo Mozilo Charged With Fraud, FOXBUSINESS ONLINE, June 04, 2009 
available at http://www.foxbusiness.com/story/markets/countrywide-ceo-mozilo-charged-
fraud/.  These charges stem from Mozilo misleading the market as to Countrywide’s loose 
lending practices and his $140 million sale of Countrywide shares at the time that 
Countrywide was on the brink of a mortgage meltdown.  Id.  According to an independent 
compensation consultant hired by Countrywide, during the same time period, Mozilo 
negotiated an inflated pay package with easy bonus targets based on a flawed peer group.  
Elizabeth MacDonald, Highlights from CEO Pay Hearing Today, FOXBUSINESS ONLINE, 
available at http://emac.blogs.foxbusiness.com/2008/03/07/highlights-from-the-fat-cat-
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possible repercussions of unclean hands on the part of corporate executives.  
During the negotiation of his compensation package, he fired two 
independent compensation consultants who had concluded that his pay 
package was excessive before he found a consultant to approve it.232  
Notably, Mozilo’s bonus targets under the contract were set at 
approximately half the company’s current revenue.233  After Mozilo’s 
strong-arm tactics secured his unreasonable compensation, he then engaged 
in and potentially covered up the reckless risk-taking that brought down the 
company.234  Whether or not the SEC is able to secure a judgment against 
him for fraud and insider trading, unclean hands should allow the company 
to reclaim some of the money he pocketed at its expense.235
Of course, the devil is in the details of any litigation.  A court would 
still need to find and weigh the relevant facts and circumstances outlined 
earlier before it would invoke unclean hands.
 
236  Moreover, for the defense 
to work, directors must be willing to withhold payment—and defend the 
lawsuit on behalf of the company on the basis of unclean hands—and/or 
seek rescission if payment has already been made.237
It is well known that director indulgence of CEO salaries and other 
incentives has contributed to overcompensation.
 
238
 
hearing-today/. 
  Directors have also 
participated in various forms of wrongdoing.  Nevertheless, board tolerance 
(or feigned ignorance) has not occurred in every situation.  To be sure, 
 232. See MacDonald, supra note 170; see also Bizjak et al., supra note 213 (discussing 
the perils of compensation consultants). 
 233. See MacDonald, supra note 232. 
 234. For instance, Mozilo threatened to quit (triggering a severance package that 
included liquidating 12 million shares in the bank) if the company refused to pay the income 
taxes on his wife’s use of the company jet.  MacDonald supra note 170.  He also sought to 
collect $3 million in benefits that he was eligible to receive only when he retired.  Id. 
 235. See Robert Khuzami, “Statement from an SEC Director on Mozilo Charges,” June 
4, 2009, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch060409rk.htm (discussing 
the filing of fraud charges against Countrywide executives); see also Barnes & Ossinger, 
supra note 231.  Mozilo’s salary was nearly $2 million when Countrywide’s stock plunged 
80% from its five year peak.  MacDonald, supra note 170.  He also received $20 million in 
stock awards as part of his performance measure (and sold another $121 million in stock) 
despite Countrywide’s reporting of $1.6 billion in losses.  Id.  Mozilo stood to gain upwards 
of $100 million in severance when Countrywide was purchased by Bank of America.  
Barnes & Ossinger, supra note 231. 
 236. See, e.g., Markham, supra note 60, at 316 (listing Grasso’s accomplishments while 
in charge of the New York Stock Exchange). 
 237. The potential viability of the “clean hands” doctrine in excessive pay cases may 
also provide bargaining leverage to a company so that executives reconsider asserting their 
right to extreme compensation.  The fact that directors will litigate the contract case on 
behalf of the company should minimize the possibility that the CEO could successfully 
claim unclean hands or in pari delicto.  Anenson, Process-Based Theory of Unclean Hands, 
supra note 29 (distinguishing the two defenses). 
 238. See the discussion in supra note 107. 
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countless cases of CEO shenanigans concerning compensation have caused 
harm to their companies without the knowledge or involvement of the  
board.  The many instances of stock option backdating are one example.239  
Executive acceptance of underpriced initial public offerings is another 
example.240  Significantly, in both situations, evidence from business 
research suggests that the number of executives exposed by such ethical 
failings is but the tip of the iceberg.241
 
 239. While the board of directors is typically not involved in these schemes—for 
example, Apple Computer—other executives besides the CEO can be party to them—for 
example, Converse Technologies.  A recent incident forced CEO Bruce Karatz at KB 
Homes to resign.  He is facing criminal charges with the potential of life in prison.  He is 
alleged to have defrauded investors by backdating millions of stock options over six years 
for a personal profit of $7 million and then lying about it.  See Spotlight On Stock Options 
Backdating, available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/optionsbackdating.htm (describing 
SEC enforcement actions against stock options backdating). 
  Therefore, not only is it possible 
that directors will raise the doctrine of “clean hands,” but the defense can 
potentially capture conduct that the SEC and other enforcement agencies 
cannot (or have not). 
 Stock options allow the recipients to buy shares at the price for which a stock is 
trading on a certain date.  Backdating can make options more valuable by allowing the 
recipient to pay the price at which a stock was trading on an earlier date, when the stock was 
selling for less.  Backdating is not illegal per se, but companies are required to disclose and 
account for any back-dating.  Ritter, supra note 75, at 133.  The issuance of additional 
shares dilutes the ownership interests of the existing stockholders.  Id. at 132.  It is estimated 
that the revelation of backdating results in a stock price drop for the average firm of 
approximately 7%, roughly $400 million in market value, while the average gain from 
backdating to the executives is only about $500,000 per firm annually.  See M.P. Narayanan 
et al., The Economic Impact of Backdating Stock Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597 (2007) 
(discussing the impact of backdating stock options); see also Ritter, supra note 75, at 137 
(concluding that the disproportionate effect of private gains to executives through stock 
option backdating are small in comparison to the costs imposed on shareholders). 
 240. Executives who have been “spun” (bribed) by investment banks are less likely to 
switch investment bankers on subsequent deals.  Xiaoding Lui & Jay R. Ritter, Corporate 
Executive Bribery: An Empirical Analysis (2007 Working Paper), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=968712; see also Ritter, supra note 75, 
at 138 (noting that when Bernie Ebbers was receiving underpriced IPO allocations from 
Citigroup and its predecessors during 1996-2001, Worldcom paid over $100 million in 
investment banking fees on various deals, nearly all going to Citigroup companies).  Under-
pricing of IPOs raises less money for the issuing firm and reduces the returns of their pre-
issue shareholders.  Ritter, supra note 75, at 139. 
 241. See Ritter, supra note 75, at 131-41.  Professors Heron and Lie estimate that 29% of 
publicly traded U.S. firms manipulated grants to top executives at some point between 1996 
and 2005, with the frequency higher for tech firms, small firms, and firms with high stock 
price volatility.  Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, What Fraction of Stock Option Grants to Top 
Executives Have Been Backdated or Manipulated? (2008 Working Paper), available at 
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/elie/Grants-11-01-2006.pdf.  Professors Lui and Ritter 
identified 134 officers and directors of 56 companies that went public in 1996-2000 for 
which one or more of the corporate executives were recipients of hot initial public offering 
allocations from its bookrunner.  Lui & Ritter, supra note 240. 
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Furthermore, even providing for the penchant of directors to defer to 
the CEO, the changing legal landscape and public furor over executive pay 
should cause directors to reconsider their alliances.  Shareholder advocates, 
especially institutional investors, are rallying against runaway executive 
pay and boards are responding.242  Board member positions are now at 
stake.243  Increasing public and investor oversight should encourage 
directors to resort to equity and withhold or rescind payment when 
warranted.244  Warren Buffet’s warning to companies is undeniable:  “[I]n 
judging whether corporate America is serious about reforming itself, CEO 
pay remains the acid test.”245
Potential political safeguards, such as requiring an independent 
compensation committee not paid by management, should also help curb 
compensation excesses at the outset or facilitate the later assertion of 
contractual defenses such as unclean hands.
 
246
 
 242. For anecdotal evidence of board responsiveness to shareholder activism, see Lui & 
Ritter, supra note 240, at 2 n.3 (noting the high-profile cases of Pfizer and Home Depot 
where the vote-no campaign contributed to the ouster of the CEO); L. Reed Walton, 
Preliminary U.S. Postseason Report, RiskMetrics Group, Risk & Governance Blog, 
available at http://blog.riskmetrics.com/2008/07/preliminary_us_postseason_repo.html (last 
visited May 22, 2009) (describing how Washington Mutual reversed its bonus decision, 
replaced the chair of the human resources committee and made a number of other significant 
governance changes after nine directors received at least 26% opposition, including more 
than 40% opposition for the chair of the human resources committee, at the company’s 
annual shareholder meeting).  To defuse public anger, several companies have recently 
revamped the compensation structure of executive and other employee pay.  See Francesco 
Guerrera & Julie MacIntosh, JPMorgan to Lift Pay and Cut Bonuses, FIN. TIMES, July 25, 
2009 (reporting that JPMorgan’s compensation decision mirrors decisions by Morgan 
Stanley, Citigroup and UBS).  For additional discussion of say on pay reform, see supra Part 
II.A. 
  Impending reforms will not 
 243. Vote no campaigns that target particular board members have proven effective in 
reducing CEO pay.  See Ertimur et al., supra note 42, at 27-31 (showing $3.1 million 
reduction in total compensation across firms and a $5.5 million reduction in firms with 
abnormal pay); see also J.A. Grundfest, Just Vote-No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing 
with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1993) (explaining vote no 
campaigns).  If directors are ousted, an excessive pay package that was negotiated by 
“captured” directors may later be reconsidered by new directors who may be more willing to 
halt bonuses and other incentive-driven compensation schemes, especially when outsized 
pay is coupled with reckless risk-taking that causes harm to the firm. 
 244. CEOs, in particular, have achieved celebrity status with attendant public appetite for 
information.  See Patricia S. Abril & Ann M. Olazábal, The Celebrity CEO: Corporate 
Disclosure at the Intersection of Privacy and Securities Laws, 46 HOUSTON L. REV. 1545 
(2010); see also Ertimur et al., supra note 42, at 23 (noting increased public access to 
company financial information after Enron). 
 245. Warren Buffet, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2003 Annual Report (2003). 
 246. See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., 
dissenting) (“Compensation consulting firms, which provide cover for generous 
compensation packages voted by boards of directors, have a conflict of interest because they 
are paid not only for their compensation advice but for other services to the firm—services 
for which they are hired by the officers whose compensation they advised on.” (citing, for 
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completely eliminate all factors that contribute to contract terms overly 
favorable to top executives.247  But even so, aggressive tactics by 
executives to take undue advantage of those terms clearly leaves a role for 
the “clean hands” doctrine.248
The defense’s most opportune function, however, is perhaps its most 
important.  Unclean hands could be utilized to correct ongoing problems 
with the payment of bonuses at AIG and the nine other financial firms that 
received billions of dollars in federal funds.
 
249
 
example, BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 85, at 37-39)), cert. granted, 129 S.Ct. 1579, 173 
L.Ed.2d 675 (Mar 09, 2009).  For a discussion of federal and state reform proposals, see 
supra Parts II & III. 
  At AIG, the political and 
 247. See, e.g., Stephen M. Salley, Note, “Fixing” Executive Compensation: Will 
Congress, Shareholder Activism, or the New SEC Disclosure Rules Change the Way 
Business Is Done in American Boardrooms?, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 757 (2009) (discussing the 
efforts and likely effectiveness of Congress, activist shareholders, and the SEC’s new 
executive compensation disclosure rules); Frank Rich, Wall Street Gets Rich at Main 
Street’s Expense, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Oct. 20, 2009, at 6-7 (expressing pessimism 
that there will be comprehensive financial reform).  For discussion of peer group abuse and 
its effects, see Jensen et al., supra note 217, at 56 (“We believe that the misuse of survey 
information provided by compensation consultants has led to systematic increases in 
executive pay levels.”); see also Markham, supra note 60, at 286 (discussing abuses of peer 
groups).  The peer group that is used to analyze CEO compensation is seldom reported and 
often differs from the group used on the performance graph on the firm’s proxy statement.  
See John W. Byrd et al., Discretion in Financial Reporting: The Voluntary Disclosure of 
Compensation Peer Groups in Proxy Statement Performance Graphs, 15 CONT. ACCT’G 
RES. 25 (1998) (analyzing selection of firms on the performance graph in the proxy); 
Michael Faulkender & Jun Yang, Inside the Black Box: The Role and Composition of 
Compensation Peer Groups (2008) (working paper, on file with authors) (examining choice 
of peer groups in sample of 395 of the S&P 500 firms and 262 of the S&P Mid-Cap 400 
firms that provided explicit lists of compensation peer companies in their first fiscal year 
ending after December 15, 2006). 
 248. A recent study of changes made in pay practices by 191 of the nation’s largest 
companies in the first half of 2009 shows that, despite the deleterious consequences of 
short-term profiteering to the U.S. economy, short-term incentives are an even bigger 
component of compensation.  Gretchen Morgenson, Fair Game: The Quick Buck Just Got 
Quicker, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/business/16gret.html?_r=1.  A prior survey disclosed 
that 74% of corporate executives believed that bending the rules was acceptable to achieve 
performance goals.  John F. Veiga et al., Why Managers Bend Company Rules, 18 ACAD. 
MGT. PERSP. 84 (2004).  Banks have also resurrected the practice of giving guaranteed 
bonuses that provide million-dollar payouts regardless of performance.  See Eric Dash, 
Effort to Reign in Pay on Wall Street Hits New Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2009, at A1, 
A3 (reporting guaranteed bonuses made by Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, and Morgan 
Stanley and AIG’s pending $281 million bonus payouts to retain employees). 
 249. Accord Thomas, supra note 225, at 441-43, 445-46 (suggesting other equitable 
theories like unjust enrichment and constructive trust to remedy the AIG bonus problem); cf. 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, A.I.G.’s Bonus Blackmail, OpEd, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/opinion/18cunningham.html?_r=1 (suggesting the 
analysis of traditional contract defenses and other legal remedies to rescind the March 2009 
bonus payments at AIG).  The initial bonuses were paid in March 2009.  Bernard, supra 
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public pressure to withhold payment to executives and other employees 
responsible for the downfall of these companies has delayed the latest 
round of these purportedly contractually-mandated payments.250  It must be 
emphasized that the defense’s application in these situations has the 
potential to save the public millions of dollars.251  Add to that amount the 
millions in bonuses planned by government-controlled mortgage finance 
giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under existing contracts, and it is 
worth the effort to analyze whether these employees still retain their “clean 
hands” that would allow continuing compensation.252
 
note 22.  The second round was scheduled for July 2009.  Id.  For news of bonuses at the 
banks, see Story & Dash, supra note 25. 
 
 250. Lavonne Kuykendall, AIG Holds Off On Some Bonus Payments, WALL ST. J., July 
24, 2009 (reporting that AIG held off on the July payments and is negotiating with its 
executives to reduce the bonus payments due to employees of the company’s financial 
products unit).  All bonuses were contracted for in 2008 before the government bailout.  Id.  
For 2009 contracts, the Obama Administration has power to reject executive pay plans for 
companies that are part of the $700 billion bank bailout.  Id.  Kenneth Feinberg of the 
Treasury Department was reviewing proposals for executive compensation packages 
submitted by seven bank and industrial companies on August 13, 2009.  Deborah Solomon, 
U.S. Pay Czar to Rework Contracts Deemed High, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2009 (listing 
companies as Citigroup Inc., Bank of America Corp., American International Group Inc., 
General Motors Co., Chrysler Corp., Chrysler Financial and GMAC Financial Services 
Inc.).  Treasury will reduce the salaries of the top twenty-five earners at companies 
receiving government aid; certain executives have been given immunity like AIG’s new 
CEO, Robert Benmosche.  Leslie Scism, et al., AIG Chief: Loud Voice and Listener’s Ear, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2009, at C1, C5 (reporting Benmosche’s government-approved pay 
package is worth $7 to $10 million). 
 251. The AIG payments include $235 million for employees of the financial unit 
responsible for the company’s downfall as well as the subsequent installments of $9 million 
in bonuses for top executives.  Bernard, supra note 22.  The March 2009 bonus payments to 
employees in the financial products unit totaled $165 million.  Cunningham, supra note 249; 
see also Jeremy Pelofsky & Lilla Zuill, AIG Reveals $455 Million in 2008 Performance 
Bonuses, Reuters, May 5, 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE5446VC20090505 (reporting that these 
additional payments would supplement performance bonuses of $454 million paid to 
employees and executives in 2008).  Extending the doctrine of “clean hands” to employees 
(as well as CEOs and other executives) is warranted in this situation because their reckless 
risk-taking caused the company’s collapse.  Courts should exercise caution in invoking 
unclean hands regarding pay without such morally reprehensible conduct against lower-
level employees who do not have fiduciary duties to the company. 
 252. President Obama advised the Treasury Department to “pursue every single legal 
avenue” to withhold or recover the AIG bonuses.  Cunningham, supra note 249; see also 
Brian Sullivan, Fannie, Freddie Bonuses Hit $210 Million, Apr. 3, 2009, available at 
http://briansullivan.blogs.foxbusiness.com/2009/04/03/fannie-freddie-bonuses-hit-210-
million (reporting that the companies paid nearly $51 million in 2008, and are scheduled to 
make $146 million in payments in 2009, and $13 million in 2010).  Fannie and Freddie are 
not recipients of TARP funds and, as a result, are not subject to nonbinding shareholder “say 
on pay.”  Id.  (reporting that the companies are planning to pay more than $210 million in 
bonuses through 2010); see also Eric Dash, Fannie Mae to Restate Results by $6.3 Billion 
Because of Accounting, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, at C1 (reporting that the Office of 
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In summary, rather than being ill-suited for the complexity of 
ascertaining “clean hands” in the case of CEO overcompensation, judges 
and even juries are probably the perfect forum for weighing complicated 
facts, motives, conduct, and community values.253
VII. CONCLUSION 
  It should be emphasized 
that unclean hands is not being offered as an ending to the intractable issue 
of executive compensation, but as a new beginning of perspective and 
exploration.  Accordingly, like its ancient use in contract cases, the legal 
sanction of dismissal may be capable of reining in rogue business 
executives and the directors who serve them.  Early equity tradition reflects 
the prevailing belief that corporate management has ethical responsibilities 
that the common law—and equity—can help discharge.  As a result, the 
“clean hands” doctrine should be considered as an antidote to excessive 
executive compensation. 
Lord Mansfield was once labeled a heretic for introducing ethics-
based equity principles into common law decision-making in commercial 
cases.254  History proved him a hero.255
 
Housing and Enterprise Oversight, which regulates Fannie Mae, announced that it was suing 
its former executives to recover compensation paid to them when Fannie Mae was 
overstating earnings by $6.3 billion).  Prior to the EESA, Congress passed the Housing and 
Economic Recovery Act in July 2008 which imposed restrictions on compensation for 
executives of federal home loan banks, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and limited golden 
parachute payments to executives.  H.R. Rep. No. 111-50, (2009). 
  Now that “[m]anaging has given 
 253. Accord Richard W. Wright, Substantive Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 625, 
689 (1992) (asserting that the reasonable person provides guidance in choosing the 
“intermediate, or mean between excess and deficiency in relations with others that involve 
claims to goods” (citing ARISTOTLE, V.I  NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1129b2-11 & v.2 at 
1130a32-b5 (W.D. Ross & J.O. Urmson, trans., Grinnell: Peripatetic Press, 1984))); see also 
Anenson, supra note 111, at 412-16 (analyzing the split among state courts whether an 
equitable defense to a legal claim requires a constitutional right to trial by jury); id. 
(explaining that federal constitutional law mandates trial by jury of legal claims when the 
claim and defense have common issues of fact).  Because unclean hands results in judicial 
inaction, a calculation of an exact amount is not required, but rather only a determination 
that the amount withheld was more than the CEO’s fair share. 
 254. See Mason, Fusion, in EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 93, at 12; see also 
Anenson, supra note 111, at 384 (discussing how Lord Mansfield in Montefiori v. 
Montefiori, 96 Eng. Rep. 203 (K.B. 1762), decided the first reported legal case invoking 
equitable estoppel (citing Walter S. Beck, Estoppel Against Inconsistent Position In Judicial 
Proceedings, 9 BROOKLYN L. REV. 245, 245 (1940))). 
 255. Id.; see also NEWMAN, supra note 110, at 12-20 (discussing how the ethical content 
of the common law became greatly enriched with the awakening of social consciousness at 
the time of Lord Mansfield); Henry Ingersoll, Confusion of Law and Equity, 21 YALE L.J. 59 
(1912) (commenting on how Lord Mansfield “opened the common law courts to equity”).  
Lord Mansfield was overheard commenting that he never liked law so much as when it 
resembled equity.  See Harold Greville Hanbury, The Field of Modern Equity, in ESSAYS IN 
EQUITY 28 (1934) (citing Lord Dursley v. Lord Fitzhardinge, 6 Ves. 251, 260 (1827) (per 
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‘way to manipulation’ and integrity has lost ‘out to illusion,’” Americans 
have a compelling interest in considering an equitable solution to the 
problem of excessive executive compensation.256
The use of unclean hands in this situation is explained and supported 
by ethics and business literature.  It is aligned with law enforcement and 
regulatory priorities, maintains the moral and ethical values of state 
corporate law, and is synonymous with the tradition and meaning of equity 
itself.  Resort to equitable principles like unclean hands stops CEOs from 
gaining more than their fair share and allows management to reclaim the 
moral high ground.  With state and federal governments revisiting reforms, 
an additional corrective of equity will help curtail the current climate of 
graft and greed. 
 
We are not the first generation to watch our most powerful firms and 
financial icons fall from grace.257  With the temptations engendered by 
massive amounts of wealth that continue to accumulate in economic 
entities, we will likely not be the last.  Critics of the current corporate 
environment have called for “nothing less than a cultural change.”258  Law 
has the ability to influence social progress.259  The legal process both 
reflects and determines the values of society.260  The experience of equity is 
evidence of this dynamic and reflective process.  Over hundreds of years, 
equity has made inroads in the law and resulted in its modification and 
amenability to notions of fairness and justice.261
 
Lord Eldon)); see also Mason, Fusion, in EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 93, at 17 
(explaining that Mansfield was a member of the equity bar prior to becoming a judge). 
  History teaches that courts 
 256. Arthur Levitt, The “Numbers Game” (address at the New York University Center 
for Law and Business, New York, NY, September 25, 1998), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt. 
 257. LAUFER, supra note 8, at 42.  See generally Markham, supra note 60 (recounting 
tales of outrageous and abusive executive pay practices over the centuries). 
 258. Levitt, supra note 256; cf. Eleanor W. Myers, “Simple Truths” about Moral 
Education, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 823 (1996) (explaining the widespread concern for declining 
values in the legal profession and the appreciation that the commercial pressures of 
workplaces unsympathetic to ethical practice have had the greatest impact on shaping 
professional behavior). 
 259. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 197, at 752-53 (declaring 
that our institutions and processes do determine what kind of people we are (rejecting Grant 
Gilmore’s proposition that “[l]aw reflects, but in no sense determines the moral worth of a 
society” (citing GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 110-11 (1977) (Storrs 
Lectures, Yale Law School)))); see also Norman D. Bishara, Legislating Business Ethics: 
Corporate Governance, Stakeholders,and Encouraging Ethical Action (2009) (Michigan 
Business School Working Paper, on file with authors) (exploring whether legislation can 
influence the ethical values of corporate leaders). 
 260. See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 197 at 752-53. 
 261. See generally Glenn & Redden, supra note 114, at 753 (reviewing history of equity 
to demonstrate that the traditional theory of the equitable process can help solve modern 
problems); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, The Relations Between Equity and Law, 11 MICH. L. 
REV. 537, 567 n.23 (1913) (explaining that equity resulted in “a liberalizing and 
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can utilize unclean hands to stop present pay abuses and simultaneously 
affect future social change. 
It is time for the judiciary to join the political branches in a 
comprehensive response to executives bent on exploiting institutional 
weaknesses.  Legislation and regulatory policy evolve in a complex 
political and social environment.  It is well known that businesses “seek not 
only to comply with regulators and regulations but also to influence 
them.”262  Admittedly, a case-based solution to the problem of excessive 
executive compensation is but one of many methods of addressing an issue 
inherent in corporate America.263  But given the failure and insufficiency of 
the current law and enforcement efforts, it could be an important part of the 
overall solution.264
additional safeguard against the social costs and corresponding moral 
outrage caused by wayward corporate stewards who unabashedly accept 
  As such, courts should consider unclean hands an  
 
modernizing of the law” (quoting Pound)).  Professor Stephen Burbank describes the 
importance of equitable principles in the progress of the law: 
We have been fortunate that our system has included, most of the time and in 
most American jurisdictions, both law and equity, each of which requires the 
other and both of which, in combination, have helped us over more than two 
hundred years to make social and economic progress. That progress has often 
not come easily, and there is much of it still to be done. 
Burbank, supra note 81, at 1346. 
 262. LAUFER, supra note 8, at 30; see also Frank Partnoy, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW 
DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 5 (New York: Time Books, 2003) 
(outlining the ability of businesses to shape regulatory policy and reform); Michael J. 
Cooper et al., Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns, J. FIN. (forthcoming 
2009) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=940790 (tracking 25 
years of firm political contributions and finding a positive effect on future stock returns).  
For recent examples of the apparent regulatory capture of the SEC, see generally Ritter, 
supra note 75 (recounting the failure to sufficiently investigate the Ponzi scheme of Bernie 
Madoff and CEO stock option backdating).  For the influence of big business on the SEC’s 
attempts to regulate executive compensation in particular, see Martin, supra note 67, at 531 
(relaying how the SEC abandoned its effort to increase shareholder involvement in the 
nomination of directors after the business community opposed it). 
 263. See Khurana & Zelleke, supra note 4, at B4 (“We need to rethink how American 
business ought to be run, including changes to fiduciary duties, legal liability, takeover rules 
and business education, among many other areas.”). 
 264. See generally Nim Razook, Common Law Obedience in a Regulatory State, 47 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 75 (2010) (championing the role of judge-made law in supplementing the 
shortfalls of regulatory policy related to business).  Earlier calls for corporate reform 
continue to describe the perils of the existing system: 
[S]hareholder democracy, and the state chartering of corporations that are, in 
some ways far larger than their host states, have as much chance of keeping our 
giant corporations virtuous as wigs on judges have of making them wise, and 
the wrist slaps called criminal law have deterred corporate crimes as effectively 
as a fishing net slows an elephant. 
Ralph Nader & Mark Green, Corporate Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1979, at F17.  See 
generally LAUFER, supra note 8 (discussing the failure of corporate criminal law). 
ANENSONFINALIZED_ONE_UPDATED 9/9/2010  4:46 PM 
2010] “CLEAN HANDS” AND THE CEO 1011 
 
golden parachutes as their companies go down in flames.265
 
 265. See Andrews & Baker, supra note 24 (predicting a popular backlash against the 
government’s efforts to underwrite Wall Street due to AIG’s $450 million bonus payment 
plan, explaining that “[o]f all the financial institutions that have been propped up by 
taxpayer dollars, none has received more money than A.I.G. and none has infuriated 
lawmakers more with practices that policy makers have called reckless”); Ferri & Weber, 
supra note 3, at 2 (“In the eyes of the public, the government intervention was a bailout for 
those Wall Street executives who had been profiting from the very actions causing the credit 
crisis.”); 
 
Mark Maremont et al., Before the Bust, These CEOs Took Money Off the Table, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 2008, at A1 (featuring CEOs of Countrywide Financial Corporation, 
Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, among others in a list of fifteen CEOs of large home-
building and financial-services firms who each reaped “more than $100 million in cash 
compensation and proceeds from stock sales during the past five years”).  For similar 
conduct by U.S. CEOs throughout history, see Markham, supra note 60, at 292-93 
(discussing golden parachutes for William Agee at Bendix, John Kanas at North Fork 
Bancorp, James Kilts at Gillette, Wallace Barr at Caesars Entertainment, Steve Ross at 
Warner Brothers, Henry McKinnell at Pfizer, and Richard Grasso at the New York Stock 
Exchange, among others). 
